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This study examines how the Government of Samoa (GoS) asserts development 
policy sovereignty when working with aid donors. Observations from findings of a 
review of development policy, and the author’s work in Samoa since 2002 suggested 
that GoS does in fact assert development policy sovereignty. 
The GoS is engaged with the global aid agenda and this is reflected in their 
development policy. The GoS is able to hold donors accountable to principles set out 
in high-level aid effectiveness forums. The outcomes of this research show that the 
GoS has a high level of ownership of their development programme and this is 
respected by donors.  
Samoa has a long history of independent thought and action. Through resistance 
groups such as the Mau a pule movement (Opinion of rule), Samoa stood up to the 
German and New Zealand colonial administrations between 1900 – 1961 and 
created a unique constitution when they became independent in 1962. Fa’aSamoa 
(the Samoan way) was central to the constitution and remains a strong part of 
Samoan culture today. It is suggested that the GoS officials use the Mau movement 
mindset when dealing with outsiders that come to Samoa. This is seen as a healthy 
way to act for a recipient country.     
Qualitative methodologies were used to keep the GoS at the centre of the research 
process. Interviews were conducted with representatives of the GoS, the private 
sector, civil society organisation and donors. All the interviews with Samoans were 
conducted bilingually.   
It was found that the GoS asserts its ownership over its own development through an 
educated, long serving, well informed and prepared public service. Due to a high 
calibre public service, officials know how to use donor resources to their advantage 
through the GoS development policy. Furthermore GoS officials are not intimidated 
by donors and are therefore not afraid to hold donors accountable to outcomes of 
high level aid effectiveness talks. The GoS follows the principles of the current global 





Aiga    Family 
Ali’i Sili   High Chief 
Alofa    Love 
Fa’aaloalo   Respect 
Fa’alavelave   A disruption but also refers to a cultural exchange  
Fa’alupega   Constitution  
Fa’aSamoa   The Samoan way 
Fa’avae i le Atua Samoa Samoa is founded on God 
Fiapoto Someone who thinks they know what they are talking but 
in actual fact do not Mau a pule ‘Opinion of Rule’ (A 
resistance group also referred to as Mau movement) 
Fono a le nu’u  Village Council 
Gagana   Language 
Galue fa’atasi  Work together 
Matai Chief  
Moa    Centre 
Momoli or o’o  Ceremony to confirm a new status or position 
Nu’u    Village 
Pakeha   European 
Palagi    European 
Sa    Sacred 
Tafa’ifa   Holder of four paramount chiefly titles  
Talanoa   Talk 
Tama’aiga   Paramount Chief of which there are four in Samoa 
Taonga   All things precious  
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Tapua’i   Support  
Tauivi    Never give up  
Tautua   Service 
Tino Rangatiratanga Sovereignty 
Tumua ma Pule  The two islands of Upolu and Savai’i 
Umu Ground oven 
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
 
Since the turn of the millennium the global aid agenda has placed emphasis on aid 
recipients attaining aid sovereignty. This is achieved by recipients and donors 
adhering to high-level aid effectiveness principles that encourage ownership, 
alignment, harmonisation, and mutual accountability. Since 2011 researchers from 
Victoria University of Wellington, Massey University, the University of the South 
Pacific and the University of New Caledonia have been investigating “the impact of 
changing aid modalities on development policy sovereignty in the Pacific” (Overton, 
et al, 2012, p. 25). This research contributes to this investigation, specifically looking 
at the Government of Samoa (GoS)1. 
 
The initial question of this research was to find out whether the GoS has 
development policy sovereignty. It soon became apparent that the answer could be a 
simple ‘yes’ so the aim changed to the following:  
Overall aim:  
To examine how the Government of Samoa (GoS) asserts its development policy 
sovereignty when working with donors. 
 
This overall aim raised some more specific questions: 
Research questions: 
1. What are the key elements of the global aid effectiveness agenda? 
2. How does the GoS assert development policy sovereignty? 
3. How has the GoS used the initiatives of the global aid effectiveness agenda in 
their development policy and government processes? 
4. How has the history of Samoa influenced the GoS and their dealings with donors? 
5. How does the GoS ‘development policy’ translate in daily practice? 
6. What are the markers of development policy sovereignty from both the 
perspective of the GoS and the donors?  
 
                                                          
1
 The term Government of Samoa is interchangeable between Government and the public service that carries 
out the government’s wishes as the politics has been stable in Samoa for so long. 
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To establish how the GoS has development sovereignty a review was completed of 
the GoS development policy at the start of this research. The review suggested that 
the GoS has a strong degree of sovereignty and launched me into the body of this 
thesis and the teasing out of the research questions. 
 
I lived in Samoa from February 2002 to May 2003 while working  for the New 
Zealand High Commission and I have managed the Volunteer Service Abroad (VSA) 
Samoa Programme since 2003, During this time I have developed many 
relationships and networks that have given me an inside look at the delivery of aid in 
Samoa. I came to this research being able to look through multiple lenses as an 
employee in the donor world, as an employee of a non government organisation and 
as a Samoan. This has led me to believe Samoa may be unique in the world of 
development. It is a country where officials have no problem in disagreeing with 
donors if they feel Samoa’s best interests are not at the forefront of donor 
programmes. Working as a development practitioner since 2002 I have witnessed 
how donors can dominate development work simply because they control funding. It 
is clear many aid programmes fail and the blame can be placed in both the donors’ 
and recipients’ camps.   
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has been 
working since 2000 to hold donors more accountable on effective ways to deliver aid. 
The main theme of the OECD’s aid effectiveness approach is that recipient countries 
should be at the centre of aid programmes with donors at the periphery as providing 
guidance if and where neccesary. The ideal position for any aid recipient is to have 
general budget support. This is  where donors provide money with few conditions 
leaving it up to the aid recipient to decide where the money is spent. Then it  delivers 
a report to the donor at the end of the financial year using its own financial systems. 
There is still a long way to go before aid recipients can reach this goal and 
understandably donors need to be convinced that donor money is not going to be 
misspent. 
 
Samoa gained independence in 1962.  This study highlights an example of a country 
that can maintain pule - sovereignty over their own development as an aid recipient. I 
have deliberately chosen ‘Pule’ as the title of this thesis as it reflects to me that the 
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GoS controls the donor/recipient relationship. The GoS shows a level of 
independence when working alongside donors that donors also respect. Through the 
building of lasting relationships between the GoS and donors, both parties seem to 
work collaboratively and agree on ways aid is delivered. This is not to say that all aid 
programmes in Samoa are perfect but it does confirm that the GoS is at the centre of 
their aid and development and the likelyhood of aid programmes succeeding is 
increasing.  
 
When discussing development sovereignty it is difficult not to question whether the 
GoS can be sovereign in their development when Overseas Development Assistance 
(ODA) makes up close to 30% of their annual budget. Poirine (1995) highlights that 
Pacific Island countries receive more aid per capita than anywhere else in the world. 
From these statistics it is easy to reach the conclusion that the GoS cannot have 
development sovereignty as they would not function without aid. This also reinforces 
Bertram and Watters’ (1985) Migration, Remittances, Aid and Bureaucracy (MIRAB) 
model and their suggestion that “remittances and foreign aid are the main economic 
resources of the local economy” (Poirine, 1998, p. 65). To an extent this is true: 
without the huge amount of aid being poured into Samoa from donors perhaps they 
would not be as well off as they are today.  
 
Epeli Hau’ofa (1993) in his article entitled ‘Our Sea of Islands’ challenges the 
perception of the Pacific as “too small, too poorly endowed with resources, and too 
isolated from the centres of economic growth for their inhabitants ever to be able to 
rise above their present condition of dependence on the largesse of wealthy nations” 
(Hau'ofa, 1993, p. 4). He says these views are based on economic and geographical 
points of view. His idea that Pacific Islanders instead display considerable 
resourcefulness and autonomy will be used as an on-going theme throughout this 
thesis.  
Thesis structure 
Setting the scene for this research  we take a chronological journey through the story 
of how aid has evolved from its inception to the current global aid agenda. This thesis 
looks at the implications of aid on recipient countries, particularly with reference to 
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the way aid has been delivered. It also looks at sovereignty and what this means in 
the context of this research. 
 
To place this research firmly in Samoa, chapter two looks at the history of this 
country with specific attention to the legacy of the colonial powers. The way Samoa 
has dealt to foreign powers in the past reflects the way the GoS works alongside 
donors today. Samoa’s colonial history, although significant and quite destructive, 
was very short with a resistance group forming to defend the people of Samoa from 
foreign rule. There are lines that can be drawn from this and how Samoa has dealt 
with donors, adding to the picture of development policy sovereignty in Samoa. 
 
Chapter three looks at the methods and methodology I used to undertake this 
research. It also highlights learnings that took place and subsequent changes that 
were made throughout the research. 
 
The final part of this study looks more in depth on how aid is managed and delivered 
in Samoa. It takes a close look at development policies in the context of Samoa and 
draws on the views and experiences of officials and others. Finally the thesis 
addresses the core of this research:  markers of development sovereignty. 
 
It then concludes by summarising the learnings to answer the initial question:  ‘how 











CHAPTER TWO: Aid and Sovereignty 
 
Introduction: 
Aid and sovereignty are the two concepts that establish the foundation for this 
research. By providing a background on aid we will be able to see how the GoS has 
used aid, in its numerous delivery iterations since inception, to hold donors 
accountable to current high level aid effectiveness principles. This helps to 
understand how the GoS gains sovereignty in the delivery of aid within a Samoan 
setting. Defining aid is not an easy task but this chapter will look at the increase of 
aid over the past decade, the motivations for aid and the current aid effectiveness 
agenda. The last part of this chapter looks at sovereignty and what this term means 
in the context of this research.   
Aid over the last decade 
Aid (also known by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) as Official Development Assistance or ODA) is a multimillion dollar industry 
(Warah, 2011) and has over decades remained a permanent fixture of international 
foreign relations (Wood, 1986). Aid does not necessarily imply a uniform group of 
funds or practices (Bermeo, 2009) nor does it imply that developed and developing 
countries have a shared understanding on how aid is delivered (Mertens, 2004). 
There are many forms of aid and, depending on the parties involved in the aid 
relationship, the spectrum of interpretation and method of delivery is wide.  
 
The origin of aid is a contestable topic (Hjertholm & White, 2000; Tarp, 2000). 
Tchuigoua (2009) argues that ‘aid’ was inspired by the experiences of the Russian 
Revolution. 
The Communist Party brought together the former colonies of the Russian empire as 
independent states in a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In these new republics, 
Bolshevism destroyed the exploitative primordial relations and deposed the ruling 
classes who had links to the Tsarist system. This is where the notion of development aid 
was conceived with the aim of establishing equality between the member states of the 




More commonly referred to as the genesis of aid is the Marshall Plan 1947–1952 
(Brownlie, 2008). Following World War II, the United States of America put in place a 
humanitarian economic programme that would assist Europe to recover from 
wartime destruction of industry (Gimbel, 1976; Hogan, 2002; Agnew & Entrikin, 
2004). The intention of the Marshall Plan was to help developing countries with 
economic, political and social reconstruction. The benefits for the U.S were that the 
money would be used to buy their goods therefore allowing them to retain and 
expand their super power status (Gimbel, 1976; Brownlie, 2008). The Marshall Plan 
is often referred to as the first real aid programme. I have focussed this research 
around this latter origin of aid.  
 
Synonymously ‘aid’ and ‘development’ can often be lumped together by practitioners. 
I will focus specifically on aid in this chapter, although it is important to note that it is 
difficult not to mention development when discussing aid. Indeed ‘aid’ in this thesis 
implies ‘development aid’, namely assistance with improving overall well-being. 
 
There is still no universally accepted definition of aid (Lancaster, 2007; Hunter, 1984; 
Goldthorpe, 1975; Tchuigoua, 2009). To form a foundation for this research I have 
chosen Lancaster’s (2007) definition of aid as a starting point: “an effort to use public 
concessional resources from one country to bring about sustained, beneficial change 
in another” (Lancaster, 2007, p. 3). 
 
To expand on this Hunter (1984) aptly highlights a comment made by a practitioner 
that “aid is very much ‘what people say is aid’, a situation that derives partly from the 
fact that there are two parties to any aid relationship, with often totally different 
perceptions of what constitutes aid” (Hunter, 1984, p. 158). Throughout this 
research, the two parties referred to by Hunter (1984) will be known as ‘donor’ (the 
giver of aid) and ‘recipient’ (the receiver of aid). 
 
Like the origins of aid, development theories came into practice after World War II 
and at the time of decolonisation (Coxen & Tolley, 2005). An important landmark was 
President Harry S. Truman’s inaugural speech of 1949. Truman effectively defined 
the world into two clear areas: the ‘developed’ and the ‘underdeveloped’. Truman 
stated the main aim for the developed world: 
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...should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce 
more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to 
lighten their burdens. The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place 
in our plans.  What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of 
democratic fair-dealing (Brownlie, 2008, p. 11). 
 
What followed over the next four decades was a series of theories that proposed 
ways to narrow the gap between the developed and underdeveloped, the rich and 
the poor (McMichael, 2004). During that time development was established, 
adapted, and transformed. I favour Brownlie’s (2008) definition of development as 
this best captures not only the economic aspects of development but also the human 
development aspects: 
[d]evelopment is a process of change and growth. It usually involves an improvement in 
people’s lives, so that they become better, happier, and freer… …it should also include 
social and human development, as well as issues such as respect for the environment, 
democracy, and human rights. (Brownlie, 2008, p. 11). 
 
Over the past 60 years shifts in the delivery and receipt of aid have impacted both 
policy and practice. Up until the late 1970s donors were interested in building the 
capacity of the state and trusted that aid delivered directly to recipient countries was 
the best policy mechanism for their development. The Cook Islands for example 
received general budget support in effect from the New Zealand government when it 
was annexed in 1901 until 1965.  It then became self-governing in free association 
with New Zealand following an act of self-determination under the United Nations 
(Bertram & Watters, 1984).  
 
Emerging from Rostow’s five stages of growth and to assist a country to ‘take off’ 
was the assumption that aid should be invested in tangible activities such as large 
scale infrastructure projects. Easterly (2001) refers to this as filling the ‘finance gap’. 
By the 1980s international development agencies such as the World Bank became 
increasingly concerned about the capacity of recipient countries to manage aid given 
directly to them from donors. There seemed to be little accountability and 
transparency around how aid was being spent and this old model provided 
opportunities for corruption to take place. 
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Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
In the 1980s and 1990s neoliberalism guided development policy. Neoliberalism 
looked at shifting away from budget support and large scale infrastructure projects, 
moving towards Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). In 1981 the Reagan 
administration of the U.S. and the Thatcher government in the United Kingdom, 
along with their allies, were determined to see a shift of power from the state to the 
market. The Washington Consensus describes ten policy prescriptions used as a 
baseline of directions for recipient countries from entities such as the two Bretton 
Woods Institutions - the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
- as well as the US Treasury (Stiglitz, 2003; Stiglitz, 1998). It was an agreement that 
encouraged radical reform and enforced restructuring so the market would determine 
development with less involvement from the state. Neoliberalism put development in 
the hands of markets and entrepreneurs but not political processes that were 
suggested as inefficient and open to corruption (Overton & Murray, 2011). 
Neoliberalism was further reinforced by Adam Smith’s concept of ‘invisible hand’ that 
argues the market drives the economy for positive outcomes for developing 
countries (Rothschild, 1994).  
 
The IMF and WB were able to exercise such power and spread the neoliberal 
agenda because of stabilising plans imposed by the IMF on recipient countries who 
had mounting debt problems and faced rises in interest rates and falling commodity 
prices. As a result developing countries were in major debt and unable to service let 
alone repay their loans. Peabody (1996) highlights an example of this in Latin 
America, “hyperinflation occurred at rates over 300%, limiting the effectiveness of 
investment and taxation... the deteriorating terms of trade led to shortages of foreign 
exchange, production bottlenecks, and negative economic growth” (Peabody, 1996, 
p. 824) 
 
The IMF and WB were in a position of power to bail out recipient countries by 
rescheduling their debts through concessional loans but under the ‘condition’ that the 
recipient country underwent economic reform (Beneria, 1999; Peabody, 1996). It 
was believed by the Washington Consensus that collective economic growth be 
promoted internationally eventually filtering down to the developing countries 
(Overton & Murray, 2011). Once SAPs were approved for a recipient country by the 
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IMF, conditionalities were placed on the loans or grants that were specific to their 
fiscal situation (McCann & McCloskey, 2003).   
 
With SAPs there was a belief that wealth would trickle down to poorer countries to 
assist them to become better off. SAPs however lacked a poverty focus and in fact 
increased poverty for developing countries (Thomas, Humphreys, & Carr, 2001). The 
legacy that SAPs did leave was increased poverty through unemployment, the loss 
of welfare services and weakened state capacity. Developing countries found it 
difficult to work their way out of poverty. Furthermore states were cut out of the 
neoliberal agenda and were therefore less able to perform their core functions. 
Privatisation of government owned industries impacted how the state ran its 
government. The market in fact was not able to function as originally hoped. As a 
result states began to fail as their core was weakened with overworked staff and 
fewer resources. The problem with SAPs was that it gave increasing power to large 
donors therefore weakening the power of recipients and civil society organisations. 
Conditionalities were used to manipulate the state to force reform (McCann & 
McCloskey, 2003). 
Millennium Development Goals 
In 2000, 189 nations met at the United Nations headquarters in New York for the 
Millennium summit. At the summit national leaders recognised that it was their 
collective responsibilities to developing countries to not only reaffirm the principles of 
the United Nations but to also acknowledge the goal of human dignity and equity at 
the global level (United Nations, 2000). As a result the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) were launched. These are a series of eight time-bound development 
goals that were agreed upon by United Nations General Assembly to be achieved by 
the year 2015 (Gajida, LLiyasu, & Kemevou-Asima, 2010). The goals are to: 
eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; 
promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve 
maternal health; combat AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental 
sustainability; and promote a global partnership for development (UNDP, 2010). The 
MDGs provide a framework for donors to work together towards a common end in 
order to make sure that human development reaches everyone. It was believed at 
the summit that if these eight goals are achieved, world poverty will be cut by half 
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(United Nations, 2000). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
produces the annual Human Development Report that focusses on poverty reduction 
through strategies of capacity building, empowerment, paticipation by civil society, 
good governance and environmental sustainability. The MDGs became the 
cornerstone of the New Poverty Agenda (Storey, Bulloch, & Overton, 2005). The 
MDGs became the foundation of putting poverty reduction as the centre of focus for 
donor countries (Poku & Whitman, 2011; Overton & Murray, 2011b). 
 
From 1960 to 1990 aid from OECD countries to developing countries rose steadily 
(OECD, 2011). Particularly after the creation of the MDGs, donor countries were 
determined to tackle the issue of poverty so the formula ‘doubling aid to reduce the 
poverty by half’ was adopted by donors (Guillaumont, 2009). Over the last decade, 
there has been a huge increase in aid as measured in Figure 1 (Fisher, 2011) by the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. In 2002, at the Monterrey 
Conference on Financing for Development, donor countries renewed their pledge to 
increase development assistance to 0.7% of national income, on the condition that 
recipient countries took necessary measures to improve governance and adopt 
sound policies for growth (ODI, 2005). 
 
Figure 1: Official development assistance (ODA) 1990 – 2010, billion US dollars




Donor governments pledged at the 2005 Gleneagles (G8) Summit that they would 
make a commitment to increase their ODA. What the pledges implied was raising 
ODA from about USD80 billion to nearly USD130 billion (Lesage, Van de Graaf, & 




From 2008 there was a dip in aid received from donor countries due to the economic 
recession that hit the international market. Yet despite the financial recession aid has 
continued to increase and in 2010 donor countries’ aid totalled to USD129 billion, an 
historical high. The United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Germany 
and Japan were the highest contributors of aid in 2010. The combined share of aid in 
the gross national income (GNI) of DAC member countries for 2010 was 0.32% as 
shown in Figure 2 (Fisher, 2011). 
Figure 2: Official Development assistance (ODA) 1990 – 2010, % of GNI 
                         
(Fisher, 2011) 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 
As a response to the criticisms of SAPs, in 1999 the IMF and the WB initiated 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) (Marcus, Wilkinson, & Marshall, 2002). 
Countries were encouraged to show a commitment to reducing poverty and 
achieving the MDGs by producing ‘nationally-owned’ PRSPs through broad 
participation processes (Komives & Dijkstra, 2011). Since the adoption of the eight 
MDGs in 2000 by the United Nations World leaders, donor and recipient countries 
have been able to provide benchmarks to track extreme poverty in its many 
dimensions (Clemens, Kenny, & Moss, 2007). 
 
In order for PRSPs to be successful it required a big shift in theory, policy and 
practice. Unlike SAPs, PRSPs required not only the state but relevant stakeholders 
to participate in the design of PRSPs. In order for PRSPs to be successful it required 
a participatory approach and terms like ‘empowerment’, ‘ownership’, ‘consultative’, 
and ‘results orientated’ came to the fore (Folke, 2004). Donors realised that 
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involvement by the state and stakeholders was key to the elimination of poverty 
which was at the core of the PRSPs (Gould, 2005).  
 
Recipient countries were asked to prepare PRSPs based on their assessments of 
their needs after consultation with government departments, and civil society as well 
as donors. The idea was that the recipient country would drive the PRSPs and write 
the papers themselves so they had a feeling of ownership. Unlike SAPs and earlier 
forms of aid, PRSPs pushed the message of equality in an aid programme. The 
catch was although the recipient country wrote their own PRSPs, the template, 
language and objectives were set by the donor. There were a number of 
conditionalities that were set that recipient countries had to adhere to. Recipient 
governments were to tie their budgets to a Medium-term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF) set by IMF; under the Public Expenditure Review (PER) donors were able to 
routinely check recipient public accounts; and lastly poverty reduction had to be the 
focal point for budget expenditures as defined by the WB and IMF (Gould, 2005). 
Including all stakeholders in the consultation process was crucial for the recipient 
country. Any agency that had some involvement in a PRSP had to be acknowledged. 
This gave the illusion of broad participation. The papers had to show that there were 
clear actions and targets (medium and long term) that could be measured to alleviate 
poverty. Once the PRSPs were completed to the format set by donors, the recipient 
countries could present this to the donors and it became a way recipient countries 
could secure donor funding.  
Sector Wide Approaches (SWAp) 
Following on from the PRSPs the second half of the 1990s saw the emergence of 
the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) as an aid modality. SWAps presented a process 
that donor partners could use to gain greater consistency in their appoaches to 
providing development assistance (Riddell, 2007). The SWAps differed in approach 
to earlier development policy in that they gave developing countries the opportunity 
to design programmes to address their development needs in a particular sector 
(typically education and health), as opposed to their needs being identified by donor 
partners  (Riddell, 2007), and these sector wide programmes were to be funded by 




Riddell (2007) notes that one of the main factors behind the creation of SWAps was 
to facilitate greater developing ‘country ownership’ of the process. The reality is 
some recipient countries have tarnished their reputation with donors over 
mismanaged aid programmes in the past and like any relationship, trust takes time to 
develop. Hyden (2008) questions whether mutual trust and accountability are 
attainable at all. He refers to country ownership as a goal that is striven for and not 
an established fact. Buiter (2008) argues the term ‘country ownership’ has been 
abused to such an extent that it is at best unhelpful and at worst destructive, “a term 
whose time has gone”  (Buiter, 2007, pp 647).  
 
In the design process of a SWAp, both the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda 
for Action recommend that in a spirit of consultation, the different public and private 
stakeholders come together to negotiate the indicators for a SWAp. However while it 
is a consultative process in theory, the practical application does not always match 
intended reality.    
 
The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) produced a series 
of reports in 2004 on SWAps and civil society. In Report 1 (NORAD, 2004a) it 
highlights examples where consultation in the design process was skewed for 
various reasons. In Uganda, consultation was by invitation only and often smaller 
Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) were overlooked. In Malawi although a 
range of NGOs were invited to consultative workshops very few took part due to lack 
of understanding of the process. In the case of Mozambique the involvement of 
CSOs was largely dependent on the government and their support of CSOs. This 
support was often very small. It is evident in the reports that very few local CSOs 
were aware of their role in the design process. The reports also noted the lack of 
synthesis between stakeholders. There were obvious communication barriers 
between groups and little chance to interact due to the way information filters from 
the top to the bottom. In Zambia, the quality of the consultative process was 
challenged in an education SWAp where documents were released so late that all 
decisions had been made prior to the dissemination of the information. This 
effectively ignored the comments from the CSOs and assumed they did not carry 
any significance (NORAD, 2004b). The design process in these examples was 




It is difficult to identify if real ‘consultation’ has taken place. Mitlan (2001), highlights 
that higher income groups tend to take on leadership positions to the exclusion of 
other groups in the community. There is often little real consultation of the ‘ordinary’ 
citizenship, especially women. And if there are benefits that are secured from a 
consultation process, in general many of these  appear to only personally benefit the 
elite community leaders. In addition, Mitlan (2001) says that how the views and 
voices of such a range of people are composed into country ownership remains a 
mystery. Development negotiations, to arrive at agreed indicators, require the 
representatives of each group to have a strong voice to ensure they are not drowned 
out by more dominant members.Therefore, although participation may be increased 
through the SWAp process, this participation does not always lead to wide 
representation. 
 
There is an existing dichotomy regarding the role that CSOs should play in a SWAp. 
Riddel (2007) states even where traditions of consultation exist, the involvement of a 
CSO runs the risk of being token or, otherwise known as the ‘tick box venture’ 
(Ishkanian, 2006)  to appease donor requirements in a SWAp process. Theoretically, 
in countries where CSOs are strong, they will have a more direct influence on how 
much civil society is included in the SWAp process and their ability to affect policy 
more substantially. However, Uganda has a history of strong CSOs and is upheld as 
an example of best practice for the development sector. Yet independent research 
has shown that this is not necessarily the case. While participation in negotiations 
has increased, the evidence of CSO representation and influence on subsequent 
policy has not been as clear. The Uganda case also highlighted the issue of the 
method of inclusion and exclusion of different organisations (Lister & Nyamugasira, 
2003).  
 
A major concern in the SWAp process is capacity building. In the case of the 
education SWAp carried out in Burkina Faso (NORAD, 2004b), while national 
ownership had improved considerably to past project implementation there remained 
two major hurdles in the establishment of national ownership. Firstly too little 
leadership from the Ministry of Education and secondly too much pressure from 
donors highlights capacity issues. The donors in the Burkina Faso case actively 
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focussed on strengthening capacity in planning, finance and administration, and 
human resources of the Ministry of Education. Unfortunately the donors were not 
confident that local capacity was strong enough to manage a SWAp. This was 
largely because of limited external support for capacity building, and because 
ministries gave little priority to developing local capacity to implement the SWAp 
indicators.  
 
Killick (2005) discusses, in his policy brief on the SWAp in Ghana, that the budgetary 
process is so weak it is essentially a ‘ritualised facade’ and has little relation to the 
reality of actual state spending. Killick’s policy brief highlights evidence of large 
leakages in allocated funds between central government and local service delivery of 
up to 51% leakage in non-salaried expenditure in education and 7% leakage in non-
salaried expenditure in health clinics. Failings can be attributed to the lack of 
transparency in the budget process, wider public and interested non-state parties 
being excluded from budgetary discussions and the Government of Ghana’s lack of 
time and resources to provide any real scrutiny that is not “hurried, superficial and 
partisan” in nature (Killick, 2005, p.2).   
 
The expectations put on all levels to implement the indicators in a SWAp can result 
in major gaps in the delivery on the ground. Reflections on policy, partnership, 
strategy and implementation of the Education reform in Uganda (Ward, Penny, & 
Read, 2004) identified a gap in curriculum development and the implementation 
stage. The curriculum was launched into schools with no overall plan, no budget and 
no department nor individual with line management responsibility for its launch. The 
result was catastrophic with the late delivery of the curriculum to schools, with 
textbooks and teachers’ guides arriving up to three years late. At the grassroots 
level, no policies were in place for the recruitment and career development of 
teachers. There was no clear career and professional route for those who wanted to 
pursue a career in teaching. Few teachers had recent and relevant primary school 
teaching experience. In the Uganda case skills and capacity were scarce and 
unevenly distributed. Most levels lacked a technical grasp of issues, and a proper 




One of the main intentions of a SWAp is country ownership. Developing countries 
are encouraged to own the development process, to be a part of the consultations, to 
actively contribute towards policy formulation, and be actively involved in the SWAp 
implementation. However, if the agreed policy designed by the developing country 
does not match that of donors, it will be altered accordingly. The reality of the SWAp 
may be compared to buying a house with a bank loan. You as the owner own the 
house, however the bank sets the specifications such as the price, condition and, 
sometimes, even location of the house. The bank has the authority to change 
floating interest rates without your approval and if you forfeit on payments long 
enough you will lose the house in a mortgagee sale. At the end of the day the bank 
walks away with more money and you may be left homeless.  
 
It has been demonstrated that SWAps place a huge amount of pressure on 
developing countries with unrealistic expectations of local staff who do not always 
have the capacity to carry out guidelines that are still implemented from above.  
Aid effectiveness  
Running parralel and also influencing aid policy and practice is the dialogue on aid 
effectiveness. There has been much speculation around the effectiveness of aid 
delivery (Booth, 2011; Glennie, 2011; Gulrajani, 2011; Bird & Glennie, 2011; Busse; 
Buss, 2007; Hansen & Tarp, 2000; Beneria, 1999; Cassen, 1994; Hayter, 1971). 
Since the adoption of the MDGs donor countries have been in ongoing dialogue on 
ways these goals will be achieved by 2015. One positive outcome of the discussions 
on aid effectiveness is that donor countries have identified that some of their 
practices have proven to be problematic for recipient countries. Donors have 
acknowledged that the lack of working together, overzealous targets, unrealistic 
timeframes and budget constraints have worked against the very goal of poverty 
elimination (OECD, 2010).   
 
A series of high level forums to discuss aid effectiveness have taken place since 
2000. The purpose of the forums have been primarily to ‘make the right to 
development a reality for everyone’ (OECD, 2010). A set of principles on aid 
effectiveness was agreed to by over 200 countries as the template for meeting the 




Rome hosted the first high level forum on aid effectiveness - the Rome Declaration 
on Harmonisation 2002. The Rome Declaration listed the following priority actions: 
 that development assistance be delivered based on the priorities and timing of 
the countries receiving it, 
 that donor efforts concentrate on delegating co-operation and increasing the 
flexibility of staff on country programmes and projects,  
 and that good practice be encouraged and monitored, backed by analytic work to 
help strengthen the leadership that recipient countries can take in determining 
their development path.  
 
The second high level forum, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 
2005), proposed a shift towards country ownership for developing countries through 
harmonising and the use of differing aid modalities. The Paris Declaration aimed to 
learn from mistakes made from programme and project aid approaches  (Hyden, 
2008). “The Paris Declaration on Aid is a landmark international agreement and 
programme of reform – the culmination of several decades of attempts to improve 
the quality of aid and its impacts on development” (Wood, et al., 2011, p. xii). It was 
brokered by the  DAC and was the first time that both donors and recipients agreed 
to joint commitments and to hold each other accountable. “The Paris Declaration 
marked a significant and potentially revolutionary change in the way aid was 
conceived and delivered and it represented a remarkable consensus amongst most 
of the aid community” (Overton et al, 2012, p. 26) 
 
The Paris Declaration principles are a key influence on the global aid effectiveness 
agenda. Both donors and recipients use the Paris Declaration to influence 
development policy and daily operations.  
The Paris Declaration followed five key principles:  
1. Ownership: Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their 
development policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions. 





development strategies, institutions and procedures’ 
3. Harmonisation: Donors’ actions are more harmonised, transparent and 
collectively effective 
4. Managing for Results: Managing resources and improving decision-making 
for results 
5. Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development 
results 
The first principle of ‘ownership’ is crucial to this research. Ownership encouraged 
recipeint countries to develop their own strategic plans to address development 
issues. Donors would align their assistance with these plans and work more closely 
with other donors to encourage ‘harmonisation’ (the second principle of the Paris 
Declaration) therefore creating more sustainable development programmes for the 
recipient country (Eyben, 2007). Ownership also recognised the recipient country’s 
own institutions and systems. If a recipient country could prove to donors they had 
robust financial systems then donors would use a recipient country’s financial 
systems rather than recipient countries having to account for donor funds through a 
myriad of different financial systems which had been common practice in the past 
(OECD, 2005). There are always human resource issues for recipient governments, 
and finding time to report to donors using their respective financial reporting systems 
is challenging, so having one system to report on is a better use of time (Wrighton, 
2010).  
 
The Paris Declaration also moved away from individual aid projects that were led by 
donors, towards programmes that used recipient country reporting systems and gave 
the recipient country a license to lead their development work not only in ‘policy’ but, 
more importantly, in ‘practice’ (Overton et al, 2012). 
 
The Paris Declaration principles were not without their faults. Consequently the 4th of 
September 2008 marked the third high level forum on aid effectivness held in Accra, 
Ghana, to develop the Accra Agenda for Action (OECD, 2008). The Accra Agenda 
reviewed the progress and shortcomings of the Paris Declaration and proposed a 
way forward for its member countries. Accra specifically targeted the principles of 
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strengthening country ownership over development, building more effective and 
inclusive partnerships for development, and delivering and accounting for 
development results (OECD, 2008). Its intention was to emphasise the 
implementation of the goals set in the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness in 2005. 
Unfortunately policy does not always reflect reality. One critic, Kharas (2008), titles 
his article on the aid effectiveness meeting in Accra as ‘Old Promises, Different City’. 
The most recent and fourth high level forum was hosted by Busan, South Korea in 
November 2011. The focus at Busan was whether progress in the aid effectiveness 
agenda is enough to overcome even greater global challenges.  
Sovereignty 
The aid effectiveness agenda of the 2000s was a deliberate move away from a top-
down neoliberal approach that saw the donors at the helm of aid (OECD, 2008). The 
move was essential in order for aid to be effective. Under the new aid modality, 
recipient countries are encouraged to be drivers of their own development and 
therefore having sovereignty is crucial. In the context of this research ‘sovereignty’ 
refers to the level of self-determination the GoS has when dealing with donors.  
 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness’ principle of ownership focuses on state 
to state transfers (Overton et al, 2012). Wiessner (2007) refers to the origins of 
sovereignty as a Western concept that replaced a feudal system with that of a 
nation-state. Sovereignty underpins every legal system (Wiessner, 2007) and the 
state refers to Western-styled democratic states that are,  
politically independent entities, exercising various practices of sovereignty including 
upholding fixed geographic borders and determining who can reside within them, 
governing citizens via domestically approved policies, enforcing law and order via 
domestically controlled public forces, controlling a national currency or proxy thereof, 
and cooperating with other nation states through, for example, pursuing international 
treaties and bodies (Overton et al, 2012, p. 33). 
 
The definition of a ‘state’ in a Pacific Island context poses challenges. As identified 
by Overton et al (2012) on one hand there are states such as Papua New Guinea, 
Vanuatu, Samoa who are considered fully sovereign states but who are also 
dependent on donors so the level of sovereignty varies from country to country. On 
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the other hand there are countries like the Cook Islands and Niue who are self-
governing territories in free association with New Zealand whereby New Zealand can 
choose to take on some sovereign obligations. Sovereignty is therefore not simple to 
define. 
 
Looking at New Zealand, for generations there has been contention over the term 
sovereignty under the Treaty of Waitangi signed between the British Crown and 
various Maori leaders. Article Two of the Treaty of Waitangi assured Maori they 
would retain their sovereignty (tino rangatiratanga) over lands, villages and all things 
precious (Orange, 2004). Unfortunately for Maori the Crown did not honour the treaty 
and proceeded to strip Maori of their taonga. In the past 30 years Maori have begun 
to assert their sovereignty, holding the Crown accountable for all they have lost 
(Moon, 2000). Sovereignty, or tino rangatiratanga, for Maori in the 21st century is 
controversial for some New Zealanders. The idea of Maori having control over their 
own development could be seen as threatening to those comfortable with the 
Western nation-state that has governed New Zealand since colonisation. What the 
tino rangatiratanga view of sovereignty does is shift focus away from statehood to 
look at daily practices and institutions that can be used by people to promote control 
over their own resources and lives. 
 
As addressed in the introduction of this research, using the Western definition of 
sovereignty, and bearing in mind the challenges of this definition in a Pacific context, 
is it possible for the GoS to have sovereignty as self-determination? 
 
Epeli Hau’ofa (a lecturer at the University of the South Pacific at the time) was 
challenged by his Pacific students’ reactions to being taught that their future was one 
of dependency and not soverignty due to the size of their nations. Hau’ofo states 
”[o]n the contrary ... the world of Oceania is not small; it is huge and growing bigger 
every day” (Hau'ofa, 1993, p. 6). Hau’ofa (1993) pushes the blame of the perception 
of small mindedness on 19th century colonisation that placed boundaries on Pacific 
nations that were once boundless. But this has changed with increasingly more 
Pacific people travelling far and wide expanding boundaries to all parts of the world. 
When those who hail from continents, or islands adjacent to continents – and the vast 
majority of human beings live in these regions – when they see a Polynesian or 
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Micronesian island they naturally pronounce it small or tiny. Their calculation is based 
entirely on the extent of the land surfaces that they see (Hau'ofa, 1993, pp. 6-7).  
 
At the opening of the 43rd Pacific Island Forum in October 2012 by the Prime 
Minister of the Cook Islands, Hon. Henry Puna (2012), he acknowledged that Pacific 
Island countries are small, but the collective territories places the Pacific three times 
the size of China, Canada and USA. Puna (2012) suggests that the Pacific people 
rethink their sense of identity and the Cook Islands has more recently being referring 
to the Pacific as a grouping of Large Ocean States as opposed to Small Island 
States (Puna, 2012).  
 
Hau’ofa and Puna challenge the Western perception of sovereignty. As reflected so 
far “sovereignty is neither simple nor absolute” (Overton et al, p. 35). Although it is 
important for a recipient country to have development policy aligned to the global aid 
agenda, what is more pertinent is discovering whether policy reflects practice.  
 
Sovereignty therefore is “flexible and malleable and it is continually contested and 
negotiated at a local scale through everyday interactions that contain both overt and 
subtle performances of power” (Overton et al, 2012, p. 35). Nation-states have 
processes and procedures in place to develop their own development programmes 
and therefore demonstrate to donors it is possible for them to have sovereignty. In 
the case of Samoa to find out the extent to which the GoS has development policy 
sovereignty in its day-to-day interactions when working alongside donors would be a 
good indicator of the level of sovereignty it holds. 
Conclusion 
Aid is a contestable topic. Like development some have argued that aid encourages 
statism (Liuvaie, 2009) and others have argued that aid has contributed positively to 
the development of Least Developed Countries (LCDs) (McGillivray, Feeny, Hermes, 
& Lensink, 2006). This chapter has looked at the many changes in the delivery of aid 
from its inception to the current global aid effectiveness dabate. Motivations for 
donors providing aid varies from the traditional altruistic assistance to improve 
economic growth and reduce poverty, including the poverty of opportunities 
(Addison, Mavrotas, & MCGilivray, 2005) to the more sinister as outlined by Boone 
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(1996) that delivering aid is about driving the political motivations of donors. 
Whatever the reason aid is going to be delivered to recipient countries. In order for 
recipient coutries to have sovereignty is not only dependent on aid policies they have 




CHAPTER THREE: Samoa mo Samoa 
Introduction 
There is a common Samoan saying: u’u mau lau aganu’u or ‘hold on tight to your 
culture’. Although I was born and raised in New Zealand my Samoan heritage has 
always been important to me. I worked hard to speak Samoan fluently and practiced 
writing in Samoan since I was at primary school. Despite there being extensive 
research on the loss of language and culture by the Samoan diaspora in New 
Zealand (Anae, 1998; Macpherson, 2008), at the core of many Samoans is a drive to 
not be second to anyone. Since undertaking this research and conducting interviews 
with Samoans I have often found myself asking where this pride derives from.  
 
The GoS’s assertiveness when working alongside donors is not new. Samoa has 
had a long history of assertiveness, self-confidence, and the ability to deal with the 
outside world. There have been unique situations where Samoa has used external 
concepts and adapted these to fa’aSamoa (the Samoan way) therefore making them 
their own. This starts by tracing the history of Samoa’s interaction with foreigners; 
the impact of Christianity on fa’aSamoa and fa’aSamoa on Christianity; German and 
New Zealand administration and the rise of the Mau movement and finally the impact 
of the matai (chiefly) system on the Samoan political system.  
Samoa 
Oral traditions link the origins of Samoan people to the Sa (sacred) moa (centre) 
almost two to three thousand years ago. Samoans established a way of life that 
suited their cultural context, subsistence living, social structures and a spirituality 
linking them back to their land and sea (Swain, 1999). 
 
Historically Samoa was referred to in two parts: Eastern Samoa made up of Tutuila; 
Aunu’u; Ta’u; Olosega; and Ofu; and Western Samoa made up of Upolu; Savai’i; 
Apolima; Manono; Fanuatapu; Namu’a; Nu’utele; Nu’ulua and Nu’usafe’e. The 
Americans annexed Eastern Samoa in 1900 to take advantage of the deep water 




Samoa2 has a total land area of 2,820 km2 with a population of 186,340 people 
(2011 Census) that speak one indigenous language and has a shared cultural 
tradition that is fairly consistent throughout the country. Seventy six percent of the 
population resides on Upolu and the remainder on the other islands (Government of 
Samoa, 2012). Around 40% of the population are under 15 and 97% of the 
population are Samoan (Government of Samoa, 2010b).  
Early Foreigners to Samoa 
Like many countries in the Pacific, Samoa’s history is complicated by the 
interference of foreign powers in an already complex social system. Unlike Cook’s 
description of Tonga, dubbed ‘the friendly islands’ (Veys, 2009), early explorers to 
Samoa such as Roggenwien (1722) and Bougainville (1768) did not recommend 
Samoa as a priority destination (Richards, 1994). Explorer La Perouse who arrived in 
Samoa in 1787 lost 12 men killed by Samoans during his expedition. As a direct 
result Samoa gained a treacherous reputation that limited the number of foreigners 
during the late 1700s.  
 
The number of foreign visitors and settlers in Samoa began to increase from the 
1800s with varying motivations (Davidson, 1967). Foreigners arrived mostly to 
spread Christianity and to trade and develop economic development opportunities 
for their own personal benefits (Kramer, 1994a; Meleisea, 1987a). 
 
Christianity 
Missionaries were amongst the early settlers to Samoa arriving to convert local 
people to Christianity. John Williams from the London Missionary Society (LMS) 
arrived at Sapapali’i in 1830 with eight Tahitian and Rorotongan teachers (Gilson, 
1970). Following the period of Tongan domination of Samoa there were a series of 
civil wars to identify a king. Whoever was chosen would hold the four tama’aiga 
(paramount) titles (Tuia’ana, Tu’iatua, Gatoaitele, and Tamasoali’i) of the country 
and be referred to as Tafa’ifa (literally four sided) (Meleisea, 2012). Malietoa 
Vainu’upo, the Tafai’ifa and the highest ranking chief in Samoa, welcomed Williams 
and therefore made it easier for Christianity to be spread throughout the country. 
                                                          
2
 ‘Samoa’ here and throughout this thesis refers to the former Western Samoa 
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Hymn books, prayer books and the Bible were translated into Samoa within the first 
20 years of Vainu’upo accepting Christianity to the Islands (Meleisea, 1987; Kramer, 
1994b).  
 
Christianity did spread wide and fast (Richards, 1994). Traders and whalers were 
also landing on the shores of Samoa and from a Samoan perspective it would have 
been difficult to differentiate between the groups as they brought a wealth not 
available on the island. Richards (1994) quotes Williams from his book Narrative of 
Missionary Enterprise in the South Seas: 
Williams also quoted at length a “venerable chief’ who listed enviously the clothes, axes, 
knives, and other material wealth of the foreigners and concluded, “the God who has 
given his white worshippers these valuable things must be wiser than our gods, for they 
have not given the like to us (Richards, 1994, p. 30) 
 
It is evident that there were locals who would have accepted Christianity as an 
exchange. The act of reciprocity lies at the heart of the Samoan culture. Reciprocity 
is in reference to the giving and receiving of gifts. In the Western world saving for 
retirement is factored in a weekly or fortnightly payment towards a superannuation 
plan. In the world of a Samoan your wealth is shared throughout your life contributing 
to different fa’alavelave3 (cultural exchange) (Mageo, 1991; Levine, 2003) but being 
repaid for your generosity by being supported by your extended family in your old 
age. If the principle of reciprocity is practised there will be a continued preservation 
of material wealth for a Samoan. Reciprocity also extends to relationships - sharing 
regardless of your status (Sauni, 2011). By Samoans accepting Christianity, in return 
they would not only receive material wealth but also spiritual wealth. 
 
Some could argue that Christianity in Samoa can be seen as the imposition of an 
external ideology on their culture, however Samoans have adapted Christianity to 
suit their culture and heritage and, as a result, Christianity is ingrained in almost all 
aspects of fa’aSamoa. When Samoa became independent the motto chosen for the 
                                                          
3
 The word fa’alavelave literally means a problem, interruption, obstacle, or to bother. Fa’alavelave is also 
referred to as a cultural exchange. Should a member of your community hold a wedding, funeral, birthday, 
church opening, fundraiser then it is expected that you would contribute financially or materially. However in 
return if you were to have a fa’alavelave then others would be expected to contribute financially or materially 
to you therefore completing the circle.    
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country was fa’avae i le Atua Samoa, Samoa is founded on God. At independence 
Samoa had been Christian for around 130 years (Vaai, 2012).   
 
My family have been Christians for five generations so I have always known 
Christianity as a major part of fa’aSamoa. Although Samoa did have a spirituality 
prior to Christianity (Turner, 1884) it was frowned upon by missionaries and so to by 
my forefathers. Samoans themselves were very proactive to ensure Christianity 
became a part of their culture. Keesing (1934) states “instead of accepting 
Christianity and allowing it to remould their lives to its form, the Samoans have taken 
the religious practices taught to them and fitted them inside Samoan custom, making 
them a part of native culture” (Keesing , 1934, p. 14). 
 
Samoans spare no expense when it comes to church structures and there is never a 
shortage of churches on the island. In the villages the church structures are the most 
visible and the church manse is often the most elaborate of houses. Some villages 
hold a sa (sacred) and it is a time usually between 6:00 – 6:30pm, that is blocked out 
where families in the villages are to hold their family devotions. The young men in 
the village guard the streets in uniform and no people are allowed to walk the streets, 
shops must close and no cars are allowed to leave or enter premises during this 
time. If these rules are broken there can be severe penalties issued by the village 
council.  
 
The three main denominations in Samoa are the Congregational Christian Church of 
Samoa (CCCS) with 33.8% of the population; Catholic (19.6%) and Methodist 
(14.3%) (Vaai, 2012). The rest of the population attend a range of denominations in 
Samoa. By 1962 the CCCS church became independent from the LMS, the 
Methodist church became autonomous from its New South Wales headquarters in 
Australia in 1964 and the Vatican allowed vernacular languages to be used instead 
of Latin in the church liturgy in the mid-1960s. Other religious groups in Samoa are 
the Seventh Day Adventists, Latter Day Saints, and the more recent Pentecostal 




Economically, perhaps the most influential group of foreigners in the mid-1800s were 
the Germans who dominated the trade and plantation industry in this part of the 
Pacific. All foreigners lived under the authority of the matai who were the highest 
authority in Samoa. However as time progressed, although the foreigners were small 
in number, they were strong in material wealth and they slowly began to possess the 
land. As they grew in strength, to protect their new wealth, foreigners opposed the 
control of the matai system and demanded a Western-style central government 
(Meleisea, 2012).  
 
As Germany gained economic dominance in Samoa it annexed Samoa in 1900 
motivated by Deutsche Handels and Plantagen Geselischaft (DHPG) formerly known 
as Godeffroy and Sohn who were leaders in trade and plantations, growing 
coconuts, cacao, and hevea rubber cultivation. The first German Governor to Samoa 
Wilhelm Solf could see the long term economic benefits of DHPG for both Samoa 
and the German Administration (Meleisea, 1987a). Germany took control of Samoa 
following a period of civil war. Solf’s main aim was to maintain peace in Samoa and 
to settle any question of kinship. Solf elected a paramount chief, Mata’afa Iosefa, the 
eldest of the tama a aiga titles. Solf agreed with Mata’afa to keep Samoans exempt 
from being forced to work on DHPG plantations. DHPG brought labour to work on 
the plantations from New Guinea, western Solomon Islands, Bougainville and China. 
Mata’afa was also interested in protecting the land from being purchased by 
Europeans. Aside from Apia most land was protected for Samoans, and today 81% 
of the land is still customary land. In return Mata’afa would assist Solf to keep Samoa 
a quiet and calm colony. At first Samoa were receptive to Solf’s thinking that 
Germany had established a protectorate that still permitted internal self-government. 
Sadly, contrary to Solf’s maiden speech that he would govern in accordance with 
fa’aSamoa, Samoans soon learnt that this would only occur if it was in accordance 
with the Governors’ plans (Meleisea, 1987a).  
 
Meleisea & Schoeffel (1987) highlight a story that reflects just how unreasonable Solf 
was in the way that he governed Samoa. A ceremony in fa’aSamoa to confirm a new 
status or position is a momoli or o’o. The ceremony takes the form of the distribution 
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of fine mats, food and money presented to the village, group, organisation, church 
etc. accepting the person with the new status or position. Mata’afa and his family had 
prepared a momoli or o’o for the different villages to acknowledge his newly found 
title as Ali’i sili. When Solf received news of the plans he instructed Mata’afa to hold 
the ceremony at the seat of the government in Mulinu’u rather than Amaile the seat 
of the Mata’afa title and gave strict instructions that no food be distributed and once 
each village received their gifts they were to leave immediately so that other groups 
were unaware of each other’s gifts. Mata’afa also made a speech at this momoli that 
his title as Ali’i Sili (highest ranking chief) came from the German Emperor. Samoans 
took issue with the ceremony: firstly that any paramount title was only ever created 
and bestowed by Samoans and secondly that a momoli would be held in such a 
manner going against Samoan traditions. Solf became unpopular with many other 
decisions he made that failed to acknowledge fa’aSamoa accurately. Solf became 
arrogant and indicated that he alone had final authority in any matter that he chose 
to be involved (Meleisea, 1987a) 
 
Solf also wanted to do away with the institution of Tumua and Pule that recognises 
the leading districts Tumua of Upolu and Pule of Savai’i by undermining paramount 
rank (Meleisea,1995) as reflected in Mata’afa’s momoli. There were a number of 
examples of resentment towards the German administration, none more prominent 
that the formation of the Mau a Pule – the firm opinion of sovereignty – in 1905 
(Meleisea, 2012). Their motto Samoa mo Samoa – Samoa for Samoa – implied that 
outside influence was not required or welcome. The Mau a Pule was led by Lauaki 
Namulau’ulu Mamoe, a leading orator from Safotulafai in Savai’i who wanted to 
protect and restore the national fa’alupega (constitution). Lauaki planned to present 
a petition to Solf at Mulinu’u with a large group of supporters outlining the desired 
reforms of the Mau a Pule for the German administration. Unfortunately Solf travelled 
the country to turn the people away from Lauaki and eventually Lauaki and his family 
were exiled to the Marshall Islands (Meleisea, 1987b) for their conspiracy against the 
German Administration. Germany continued to govern Samoa until 1914.                                                                                                             
The New Zealand Administration and the rise of the Mau movement 
New Zealand has a special relationship with Samoa. According to the 2006 New 
Zealand census there are 265,974 Pacific people living in New Zealand making up 
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6.5% of the New Zealand population with almost 50% represented by Samoans 
alone (Kailahi, 2007). Over the last 50 years New Zealand has had a huge impact on 
the Samoan economy and assisted in many development programmes to improve 
health and education. Many Samoans who live and work in New Zealand have 
reached high levels in all sectors. New Zealand has a very positive reputation with 
Samoa and its people. However, Samoa’s relationship with New Zealand did not 
start out positively. At the outbreak of WWI in 1914 New Zealand under Colonel 
Robert Logan who became governor, were mandated to invade and take control of 
Samoa for Great Britain (Meti, 2002).  
 
Unlike the Germans, New Zealand did not have any significant economic interests in 
Samoa and their motivation was supposedly a civilising mission (Meleisea, 2012). 
Like Solf, Logan imposed unrealistic rules that clashed with fa’aSamoa. Logan 
enforced curfews where Samoans were banned from travelling village to village 
between 10pm and 6am the next day, there were liquor bans for Samoans but much 
less for Europeans and the main method of travel by boat or canoe was also banned 
(Smith, 1924). Interestingly matai were so dissatisfied with Logan and his 
administration that Hempenstall (1978) records a telegram sent by matai to Solf 
requesting his return.  
 
Two significant events contributed towards tensions mounting against the New 
Zealand administration. The first was the influenza epidemic of 1918. Towards the 
end of World War I influenza was a worldwide epidemic, the virus killing more people 
around the world than the war itself (Ioane, 1992). The ship Talune departed 
Auckland in 1918 with reported cases of influenza on board and arrived in Samoa on 
7 November the same year. The Talune stopped in Fiji on route to Samoa and was 
quarantined, however it was not quarantined in Samoa nor were officials informed 
that passengers on board the ship carrying the influenza (Rowe, 1930). Before long 
locals picked up the sickness and lives were lost daily. It was reported that nearly 
every family in Samoa lost someone to influenza. My paternal grandfather was the 
sole survivor of his family and at a young age was taken away from his birth place 
and raised by a family miles from home. New Zealand initially did not take 
responsibility for the catastrophe which claimed 22% of Samoa’s population (Field, 
1984). Furthermore Keesing and Keesing (1956) note that the Fono a Faipule 
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(Council of Chiefs) made up of 31 members lost 24 experienced matai and orators 
taking with them valued knowledge of Samoan customs and beliefs.  
 
Logan was blamed by the Samoans for not having the Talune quarantined but he 
dismissed the claims stating that Samoans were careless in their interaction with 
those infected therefore contributing to the high death rate (Meleisea, 1987b). 
Logan’s unapologetic response led to the matai drawing up a petition requesting 
Samoa be transferred from New Zealand to the United States Government 
(Meleisea, 1987a). Logan left Samoa in 1919 and was replaced by Colonel Robert 
Ward Tate (Meleisea, 1987b). 
 
The non-violent Mau movement was again reborn as a direct result of disgruntled 
matai and Samoan leader’s attitude towards the New Zealand administration. The 
measures stipulated by the New Zealand administration were unrealistic and unfair. 
By the 1920s, with more and more foreigners living in Samoa, there were a lot of 
interracial marriages. The Mau movement was therefore not only made up of 
influential Samoan matai such as Tupua Tamasese Lealofi III, but also wealthy part-
Samoan businessmen such as Olaf Nelson who was also one of the three elected 
‘European’ members on the Legislative Council and a key figure in the Mau 
movement. Nelson was seen as a huge threat to the New Zealand administration 
(Meleisea, 1987a). The main motivation of the Mau was self-government as was 
reflected by their motto ‘Samoa mo Samoa’ Samoa for Samoa (Field, 1984).  
 
Unlike Lauaki’s attempt to unify Samoans when the Mau movement was first 
introduced under the German Administration, the rebirth of the Mau saw around 90% 
of Samoans (Pedersen, 2012) stand together and actively challenge the New 
Zealand administration, holding it accountable for its actions. This was helped by 
propaganda networks paid for by Nelson. The Mau had their own newspaper the 
Samoan Guardian, a uniform that was distributed widely, and their own police force. 
They also began boycotting certain white businesses and government services 
(Pedersen, 2012).  
 
George Spafford Richardson, who replaced Tate as Administrator in 1923, did not 
respond well to the resistance group. He found it difficult to control the growing 
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numbers of Mau followers (Pedersen 2012). He would go on to deport key leaders, 
those he believed to be the backbone to the movement and the troublemakers, to 
New Zealand.  Both Olaf Nelson and Tupua Tamasese Lealofi III were thus deported 
(Field, 1984). 
 
With tensions rising under New Zealand administration, Pedersen (2012) highlights a 
petition to the League of Nations lodged on 9 March 1928 by,  
7982 Samoan taxpayers (out of a total native tax-paying population estimated at 8500 
adult men) appealed to the League either to transfer the administration of Western 
Samoa from New Zealand to England or to grant the small territory self-government 
(Pedersen, 2012, p. 231).  
 
Inhabitants of any territory governed under a mandated authority could petiton to the 
League of Nations if they felt their rights were being violated:  
The current administration was autocratic, costly and unjust, with the Samoans ‘treated 
as a subjugated race’ and all power and positions concentrated in the New Zealand 
administrator’s hands. Ancient customs were being trampled: the administrator had 
appropriated the right to appoint hitherto elected members of the Samoans’ 
representative body; he had abolished chiefly titles; he was individualising collectively 
owned land; he had perverted the rarely used custom of banishment into a tool with 
which to punish political dissenters. Nor would he listen to their grievances, instead 
attributing their protests entirely to European instigation. This claim was “‘an insult to 
your Petitioners’ and to their ‘justifiable and creditable national aspirations (Pedersen, 
2012, p. 232). 
 
The petition was formal in its language and ornately lettered but unfortunately never 
made it beyond the British Colonial Office (Pedersen, 2012). New Zealand was 
arrogant in its management of Samoa. For years when New Zealand High 
Commissioners to London gave reports to the League of Nations regarding their 
mandating of Samoa the League were led to believe that Samoa was a model 
mandated territory. It wasn’t until 1927 that the first intimation that things were not 
going well between Samoa and New Zealand actually materialised when a former 
official in the Samoan administration made charges against former employers 
(Pedersen, 2012). The League of Nations was angered that it was not informed by 
New Zealand of what was really going on in Samoa. Richardson left Samoa in 1928 
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losing the support of both Samoa and New Zealand and he was replaced by 
Stephen Shepherd Allen. 
 
By the time Allen arrived in Samoa New Zealand had well and truly lost their 
credibility. Tupua Tamasese Lealofi III returned from deportation in 1929 to take part 
in his last protest with the Mau marking the second event that reinforced the 
resistance of Samoans. Black Saturday, 28 December 1929, saw that Mau take a 
peaceful procession through Apia led by the three paramount chiefs Tamasese, 
Tuimaleali’ifano and Faumuina. When the New Zealand police attempted to arrest a 
Mau member a scuffle broke out and the New Zealand police opened fire on the 
unarmed procession, killing the Mau leader Tupua Tamasese Lealofi III. A total of 
nine died that day with 50 people wounded (Field, 1984).  Following the death of 
Tupua Tamasese Lealofi III a number of ineffective New Zealand administrators 
were placed in Samoa. Some attempted to map out Samoa’s future with no 
consultation with the people and this annoyed the matai and leaders of the country. 
The Mau started to lose hope for self-government, but were encouraged by Nelson 
to forge on, Nelson returned to Samoa only to be deported again because of the 
possibility of the Mau reappearing. 
 
Pedersen (2012) states that Samoa went on to lodge many more petitions to the 
League of Nations, therefore helping to sustain a Samoan national movement. 
Taking heed of the resistance from the Mau movement by the 1950s, and in line with 
decolonisation pressures worldwide, New Zealand allowed Samoans to have more 
participation in their government. Sir Guy Richardson Powles spent 11 years in 
Samoa and worked together with the Samoa and the New Zealand governments to 
establish Samoa autonomy, something the Mau had fought for years to achieve 
(Field, 1984).  
 
Samoa became the first country in the Pacific to gain independence on the 1st 
January 1962. Seven months after becoming independent, New Zealand recognised 
its special relationship with Samoa. The Treaty of Friendship was signed on the 1st 
August 1962 by the New Zealand High Commissioner John Bird Wright, who 
replaced Powles in 1960, and the Samoa Prime Minister Fiame Mataafa Faumuina. 
The treaty was not to provide protection from a powerful nation over a weak inferior 
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nation but rather it was an agreement recognising the strengths of two South Pacific 
states uniting Samoa and New Zealand as mutual partners. The Treaty also acted as 
a way of righting the wrongs of New Zealand’s past in Samoa.  
Independence 
When Samoa became independent its constitution was unique in that it hoped to 
combine two very different sets of principles, a Western parliamentary democracy 
with fa’aSamoa (the Samoan way) (Huffer & So'o, 2003; Iati, 2005; Sapolu, Suaali'i-
Sauni et al 2012). The principle of fa’aSamoa was based on a matai (chiefly) system 
where titleholders represented their aiga (family), whilst the Western parliamentary 
democracy was based on a very different set of values such as individual rights, 
religious freedom and equality under law (Meleisea, 2000). 
 
In 1962 these differences did not pose too many problems as the majority of the 
people lived in the villages in a semi-subsistence eonomy (Meleisea, 2000). 
However with huge migration that saw about one-third of the population moving 
overseas during the 1970s and 1980s (Meleisea M, 2000) the constitution began to 
change. Both sets of principles have evolved significantly since 1962.  
 
Samoans were included in the dialogue in establishing a constitution for the country. 
The first Constitution Convention was held between 10 November – 22 December 
1954. There were 170 members representing different constituencies to ensure a 
broad range of people were considered during the dialogues. It was said that there 
were some very heated debates during the convention as Samoan representatives 
were keen not to lose their notions of hierarchy and social control (Sapolu et al, 
2012). The Convention included the four tama’aiga title holders Tupua Tamasese 
Mea’ole, Malietoa Tanumafili II, (joint holders of the Head of State position at 
independence);   Mata’afa Faumuina Mulinu’u II, the first Samoan Prime Minister; 
and Tuimaleali’ifano Suatipatipa held the office of deputy Head of State.  
Fa’aSamoa 
It is important to gain an understanding and appreciation of the significance of 
fa’aSamoa on this research as it impacts on the interaction between the recipients 




It is commonly understood that there are differences between Western and Pacific 
worldviews (Peet R, 1999; Shiva, 1989; Crewe & Harrison, 1998; Bodley, 1999; 
Huntington, 1996; Haverkort, van ‘t Hooft, & Hiemstra, 2003, Deruyttere, 1997). 
Figure 3 below (Swain, 1999, p. 226) illustrates some of these differences. This 
figure was used in consumer education workshops in the Pacific to illustrate the 
clash of values when the marketplace confronts Pacific Islanders and Pacific 
Islanders confront the marketplace. 
Figure 3: Differences between Western and Pacific Worldviews 
The Pacific Way      The Way of the marketplace    
Communal       Individual 
(Extended family, clan, village)    (Individual, nuclear family) 
Consensual       Confrontational 
(Participation and shared decision-making)   (Take it or leave it) 
Cooperative       Competitive 
(Seeking positive outcomes for all)    (Winners and losers) 
Reciprocal       Profit seeking 
(Sharing creates obligations to each other)   (Only obligation is money) 
Spiritual       Secular 
(Sacredness of food and products made by people)  (Only the dollar is sacred) 
 
Different cultures operate under different worldviews. Figure 3 illustrates the 
fundamental differences between the Pacific culture and the Western culture.  
 
Fa’aSamoa has many intricacies that are deeply woven into the fabric of Samoan 
culture. Although I grew up in New Zealand fa’aSamoa was instilled in my siblings 
and me from a very young age. The principles of tautua (service); fa’aaloalo 
(respect); tapua’i (support); galue fa’atasi (work together); alofa (love); tauivi (never 
give up), (Huffer & So’o, 2003) have become a part of who I am and how I think. 
Fa’aSamoa is very structured, ordered and hierarchal; roles are therefore not only 
gendered but also age specific. Mulitalo-Lauta (2000) states that fa’aSamoa 
influences individual’s values and belief systems and becomes the basis for decision 




The aiga or family forms the foundation of fa’aSamoa (Lilomaiava-Doktor, 2004). My 
mother often told me that the aiga for a palagi is essentially their immediate family 
which consists of father, mother and their children. In contrast for a Samoan, aiga 
extends to aunts, uncles and cousins who are often three to four times removed. As 
aptly put by Meleisea (1987), “[a]n aiga can be any family group from a married 
couple to a large clan comprising all the descendants of a common ancestor either 
male or female” (Meleisea, 1987b, p. 6). Each aiga is led by a matai (chief), a long 
standing governance system whereby individuals are chosen by the aiga to carry a 
chiefly title and act as their representative, voice and leader. According to Meleisea 
(1987) matai is derived from ‘mata i ai’ which connotates being set apart or 
consecrated. There are two types of matai: ali’i, which implies the title was founded 
by an ancestor who had sacred origins (Tcherkezoff, 2000); and a tulāfale those that 
speak on behalf of the Alii.  
 
Acquiring a matai title is not based on genealogical links alone. Although it is 
important to be connected to the title either by birth or marriage the most important 
aspect is service to the aiga (Iati, 2000; Macpherson & Macpherson, 2000). Certainly 
the Samoan proverb ‘O le ala i le pule o le tautua’ ‘the road to leadership is through 
service’ (Ulu Kini, 2000) best demonstrates that service is indeed a prerequisite for 
even being considered a matai title. In March 2012 the Land and Titles Amendment 
Act 2012 was passed by parliament. It was believed that matai titles were losing their 
credibility particularly when youth were given titles but did not understand their 
significance, or serious criminal offenders holding titles brought shame on the aiga. 
The Act prohibits anyone under the age of 25 from becoming a matai (Sapolu et al, 
2012).  
 
The nu’u or village is made up of different aiga. Each nu’u is governed by a 
fa’alupega, a set of ceremonial greetings (Meleisea, 1995; Huffer & So'o, 2003; Ye, 
2010) which acts as the charter or constitution for the nu’u. As noted by Iati (2005 
the nu‘u (village/polity) (Meleisea,1987) is organised by the fono a le nu‘u (village 
council) who are made up of matai within the nu’u who hold different rankings within 
the nu’u hierarchy. At the fono level matai possess a substantial amount of power 
and are expected to understand their rank, village protocols, land issues, religion and 
social control and collectively decide on what is best for the village (Lockwood, 
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1971). The Village fono manage the affairs of the village such as food production, 
health and sanitation, social control and relationships with other villages (Sapolu et al 
2012). The Village fono also have the power to strip other matai of titles if they have 
brought shame on the family, deciding on banishments, burning of properties if 
families are seen to challenge the village structures as well as acknowledging the 
positive aspects of the village (Va'a, 2000).  
 
The nu’u also has its own hierarchy of matai and depending on the nu’u both an Ali’i 
or a Tulafale can hold paramount titles, it is therefore important to note that each title 
can only be understood in the context of the respective nu’u. For example, in my 
father’s paternal village of Toamua, there are two paramount chiefly titles ‘Ulu’ and 
‘Ale’. Both titles are interchangeable and can be both ali’i and tulafale. There are 
other matai alii and tulafale that support the paramount titles but when the district 
meet these other titles have no voice only Ulu and Ale. When the different nu’u 
combines an itumalo or district is formed.  
Samoa’s unique government system 
The Western parliamentary system of the Samoan government is based on the 
Westminster model with a unicameral legislative assembly (Government of Samoa, 
2012). Samoa has a head of state whose function is to assent bills before they 
become law (So'o, 2012). There are 49 members of whom 47 are matai representing 
the 41 territorial constituencies (six have two representatives each due to the size of 
the constituency) (So'o, 2009) and the remaining two seats are for individual voters 
(So'o, 2012).  
 
At the first Constitution Convention in 1954 there were concerns over the extent that 
all Samoans would be represented by their matai and it was agreed that Samoans 
would be represented by matai suffrage therefore only allowing matai to stand for 
election and of course to vote and Europeans would be elected through universal 
suffrage. (Sapolu et al, 2012). As a result of an evolving constitution the matai 
suffrage was challenged and considered discriminatory, particularly prohibiting the 
individual’s right to vote. Universal suffrage was introduced in 1991 allowing any 




Another unique arranged marriage between the Western culture and fa’aSamoa was 
the formation of the Samoa Land and Titles Court alongside the District Court, 
Supreme Court and Court of Appeal. Samoa’s Chief Justice Patu Falefatu Sapolu 
again highlights the contradictions between the two different worldviews stating that 
the most frequent area of tension in law and justice in Samoa is between communal 
philosophy and individual rights as reflected in Figure 1 (Sapolu et al, 2012).  
To differentiate the two court systems any offences “including the non-payment of 
debts, illegal weapons ownership, sexual offence, theft, trespassing driving offence 
and assault were considered offences under both Samoan customary law and 
Western law” (Sapolu et al, 2012, p. 25) are handled by the Western legal system. 
“Samoan disputes over customary lands and titles were mainly dealt with in the Land 
and Titles Court by Samoan judges, known as fa’amasino Samoa to differentiate 
them from judges of the Supreme and Magistrate Courts” (Sapolu et al, 2012, p. 25).  
To formalise an already existing tier in the law and order hierarchy, the Village Fono 
Act 1990 gave formal recognition of the Village fono of matai and their authority in 
the village. If there were cases over customary lands and titles they were either 
handled by the Lands and Titles Court or the Village Fono.  
 
The origins of politics in Samoa saw the tama’aiga title holders in the key positions in 
Government. It was agreed in the 1960s that in order to maintain unity Samoa did 
not need political parties. However over time when lower class title holders were 
passed over for senior positions to those that held the tama’aiga titles things started 
to change.  
Conclusion 
Assertiveness and self-confidence in dealing with external forces have been traits of 
the people of Samoa since contact with Europeans through Christianity and 
colonisation. Samoa’s history is littered with examples of foreign interference that 
have helped to mould Samoa into what it is today. Christianity, although an adopted 
faith, has been turned around to suit the Samoan people and aspects of fa’aSamoa 
are reflected in many denominations today. The two key administrations that 
governed Samoa from 1900 – 1961 really did challenge Samoa with their unrealistic 
arrogant demands. However Samoans need to be thankful to the Mau movement 
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and the demands it made to resist these foreign powers. The Mau movement worked 
hard to maintain and strengthen fa’aSamoa and therefore was able to establish 
sovereignty over the land and political system. As abhorrent as the history of Samoa 
is, the people have come through relatively unscathed in comparison to other 
countries in the Pacific. They were not enslaved to work in the DHPG plantations, 
and in fact people were brought in from other countries to do this work. Samoans 
were eventually listened to by the New Zealand administration and the current 
government system reflects both aspects of fa’aSamoa and Western politics. 
Possibly the New Zealand administration released its grip on Samoa because the 
Samoans were clearly capable, intelligent, hardworking people who were not going 
to be bullied by external powers on their own land. This assertiveness and self-
confidence has carried through to today and is reflected in the way the government 








Dr Konai Helu Thaman (2003) presented a paper at the 2003 Decolonizing Pacific 
Studies Conference hosted by the University of Hawai’i. In her presentation she 
addresses how the course - Pacific Studies - has been strongly influenced by 
Western, scientific and liberal thinking. The course after all sits in a Western 
academic structure of a university. What she suggested in her presentation was that 
although Pacific Studies is being taught in a Western setting, there is nothing wrong 
with teaching it with a Pacific flavour. What was notable about Thaman’s 
presentation was her art of combining academia with anecdotal material, 
synonymous with the oral cultures of the Pacific that brings to life her topic in a way 
that reflects the Pacific. I have used this approach in my research. This chapter 
outlines what influenced my research and my methodology, and how I carried out my 
research – my methods.  
Influences to my research 
There are a number of research methodologies that have influenced this thesis. This 
next part will outline these influences and provide a synopsis of areas that I was able 
to draw on throughout my research.    
I was mindful before I started this research that a methodology appropriate to Samoa 
and its context must be taken into consideration. I made careful decisions based on 
my upbringing and understanding of fa’aSamoa to ensure that my research was 
ethical and in no way discredited the Government of Samoa (GoS). Linda Tuhiwai 
Smith (1999), urges researchers in ‘Decolonizing Methodologies’ to use culturally 
appropriate practices and the conscious development of indigenous peoples as 
researchers. Smith (1999) strongly opposes researchers and intellectuals that   
extract and claim ownership of our ways of knowing, our imagery, the things we create 
and produce and then simultaneously reject the people who created and developed 
those ideas and seek to deny them further opportunities to be creators of their own 




For many years the books produced in the Pacific were written by Western 
researchers who wrote from very Eurocentric perspectives that silenced, 
misrepresented and belittled the perspectives of the very people they studied. 
Examples of these are littered throughout most areas of research such as Pacific 
mental health (Tamasese, Peteru, Waldegrave, & Bush, 2005), education 
(Taufeulungaki, Benson et al, 2004) and the development sector (Gegeo, 1998) 
(Gegeo & Watson-Gegeo, 2002). In Thaman’s (2003) early years as a lecturer she 
was told that an article she had written for a book was deemed unfit for publication 
because “there was too much of me in it; it was too different, too personal, and too 
Tongan” (Thaman, 2003, p.10).  
 
Although I totally agree with my fellow Pacific researchers, I feel we must also be 
careful that as Pacific researchers we do not become elitist around who can and 
cannot research the Pacific based solely on skin colour and ethnicity. I feel that I can 
write with confidence about my topic not because I am Samoan (although beneficial) 
but because I place the perspectives of Samoans at the centre of this research. 
Worldviews 
“All things are subject to interpretation; whichever interpretation prevails at a given 
time is a function of power and not truth” (Nietzche cited in Cornwall, 2007, p. 471). 
To illustrate ‘worldviews’ I will use a personal example. Being married to a palagi 
woman and understanding each others’ cultural norms has its challenges. We 
discovered this recently when my wife’s aunt died. In my culture we would give 
money to assist with funeral expenses but when I suggested this to my wife she 
laughed and replied ‘my aunt has way more money than us’. It was obvious to my 
wife that her aunt would have had an insurance policy and a funeral plan to cover the 
funeral expenses. In my culture the extended family is your insurance policy and 
funeral plan based on reciprocity. And even if the deceased did have an insurance 
policy or funeral plan in place (which is becoming increasingly more popular), the 
mere act of giving is about acknowledgement of lineage.  
 
In order for me to accept my wife’s view I had to look at the event through a Western 
lens which I found amusing. We turned up on the day of the funeral, gave a card to 
the husband of the deceased (with no money in it as I was told that if we did give 
51 
 
money in the card they may have taken offence as it would appear to be a ‘hand-
out’); in lieu of flowers we could make a donation to a chosen charity; attended a 
short service where there were only two speakers; followed by sandwiches and 
sausage rolls in the church hall as only immediate family were invited to the private 
cremation. This whole concept was foreign to me. For a Samoan funeral we spend 
every night together with the family of the deceased until the day of the burial; we 
contribute financially to the funeral expenses as well as buying flowers; we sit 
through hours of testimonies about the deceased from every member of the family 
the night before the burial during a family service and repeat everything again at the 
actual funeral service the next day; every man and his dog attends the burial 
followed by a lavish meal where there is always way too much food. When we look 
at this example, both my wife and I viewed the same event with very different lenses 
based on our respective cultures and upbringings. Here is an example of two people, 
similar generation and both raised in New Zealand but with very different 
‘worldviews’.  
 
In O’Leary’s (2004) ‘The Essential Guide to Doing Research’ she states “[w]e make 
sense of the world through the rules we are given to interpret it. But because we are 
immersed in these rules and surrounded by them, they can be very hard to see” 
(O'Leary, 2004, p. 46).  Understanding worldviews therefore helps researchers to 
avoid the trap of judging others reality in relation to their own reality (O'Leary, 2004, 
p. 47).  
Ontology 
To understand worldviews it is important to unravel why humans react so differently 
to similar topics. Mathez-Stiefel et al (2006) state that human actions are an 
expression of “culturally constructed nature-society relationships that result from a 
set of symbolic representations, value systems, tacit and explicit forms of knowledge 
and practice.” (Mathez-Stiefel et al, 2006, p.70). This can be referred to as ontology, 
a branch of philosophy that explains what exists or the state of ‘being’ (Uphoff, 
2005).  When my wife’s family visit us, our four-year-old twins are at the centre of 
lounge and we sit and watch how they play, interact, dance and sing to each other 
and to us. When our twins are with my family my parents are at the centre of the 
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lounge and the children are at the periphery. No one way is correct as both have 
their positives and negatives depending on which lens you are looking through. 
Epistemology 
Seemingly more interest and work has been put into understanding epistemologies 
by Gegeo (1998); Batibasaqa et al (1999); and Gegeo & Watson-Gegeo, (2002). 
Often ontology and epistemologies are lumped together but epistemology is how 
knowledge is created and reproduced. Indigenous epistemologies proposed by 
Gegeo (1998) are essentially a cultural group’s way of thinking and of creating and 
reformulating knowledge using traditional discourses and media of communication 
and anchoring the truth of the discourse in culture. Indigenous epistemology assists 
practitioners to fundamentally change the understanding of strategies for 
development. Indigenous research ideologies such as Kaupapa Maori, as stated by 
Tuhiwai-Smith (1997) encourage researchers engaging with indigenous people to 
ask the following questions: “Whose research is it? Who owns it? Whose interests 
does it serve? Who will benefit from it? Who has designed its questions and framed 
its scope? Who will carry it out? Who will write it up? How will its results be 
disseminated?” These questions will form the basis of my talanoa.  
My positionality 
I will use the concept of ‘positionalities’ to assist in interpreting my frame of reference 
and beliefs. Knowing my birth place, education, gender, personal beliefs, 
employment, culture, political following, and religion will provide a framework for my 
research, for the purpose of this research “it is important to leave no stone unturned” 
(Hutchings, 2010, lecture). 
 
I am a first generation New Zealand-born Samoan raised in the suburb of Te Atatu 
South in West Auckland. My mother is the educated daughter of Rev Aloali’i and 
Sa’ilele Fuimaono who were Methodist church ministers in Samoa. My mother is a 
registered midwife and a trained teacher who taught for most of my life until her 
retirement. My mother is from Salani in Falealili, the fa’alupega (constitution) for 
Salani is: 
  
Afio le Gafatasi 
Le Fetalaiga ia Tofua’iofoia 
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Le mamalu ia Sata’eleaga 
Fa’apea fo’i Salani ma Alofisula4 
 
My father is from Toamua in Faleata and the fa’alupega for Toamua is: 
 
Tulou le paia aua Ulu ma Ale 
Leitulua o Sa Tunumafono 
Le Gafa o A’atoe 
Ma le Fetalaiga i le Va’aulu5 
 
My father is the son of an orator Ulu Kini and Ta’atele Ulu who served their families 
through cultural duties within the extended family. Although my father does not have 
any formal qualifications he was labelled by a family friend as ‘street-wise’ and is a 
very gifted orator. My parents returned to Samoa to retire in 2004.  
 
I am the middle child of four boys and one girl. The older three boys are close in age 
with a seven year gap between my younger brother and me leaving my sister as the 
baby. As my mother was an educator there was no choice for us but to attend 
university after secondary school. She even went as far as choosing careers for the 
three older children; my eldest brother would be a church minister, my second 
brother a lawyer and me a teacher. We fulfilled her wishes just as she planned. My 
younger brother is also a university graduate. 
 
Like a lot of first generation New Zealand-born Samoan children, although we grew 
up in New Zealand speaking English and attending a Western school, when we 
arrived home everything was Samoan. For Samoans living in New Zealand church 
was more than religion, the Pacific Island Presbyterian Church in Glen Eden became 
our surrogate village and essentially our community. For years I thought I was 
related by blood to the families at church because we attended each other’s 
birthdays, weddings, funerals and my parents also contributed financially to these 
events. I was immersed in the Samoan culture from a young age, learning how to 
dialogue in gagana (language) Samoa, read the Samoan Bible, understand my place 
                                                          
4
 This constitution pays homage to the high ranking titles of the village of Salani. 
5
 This constitution pays homage to the high ranking titles of the village of Toamua. 
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as a son and respect cultural values. I lived and breathed being Samoan and 
frequently visited the islands as a child.  
 
After secondary school I studied for my undergraduate degree at Victoria University 
of Wellington and completed a Bachelor of Arts in History followed by a Diploma in 
Secondary Teaching from the Auckland College of Education. After teaching I moved 
to Samoa and lived and worked in Samoa. It was during my time in Samoa that I was 
fortunate to develop networks with the Samoan government officials that I 
interviewed for this research. I returned to New Zealand after a year and a half in 
Samoa to start a job with Volunteer Service aboard (VSA) where I currently work as 
the Programme Manager (Polynesia). I have worked at VSA for nine years and I 
travel to Samoa frequently for work and pleasure. I am married to a palagi woman 
and together we have fraternal boy/ girl twins. We have been members of Destiny 
Church for the past nine years. 
Methodology 
I am constantly reminded as a development practitioner never to operate in a deficit 
model. Words like sustainability, capacity building, skills exchange imply that the 
donor is in the position of power when in fact in a local setting recipient countries 
already have a wealth of experience and knowledge. As outlined by Gegeo and 
Watson Gegeo (2001): “Around the world today indigenous ethnic groups are 
asserting the validity of their own ways of knowing and being, in resistance to the 
intensifying hegemony of mainstream epistemology from the metropolitan powers” 
(Gegeo & Watson Gegeo, 2001, p.55). 
 
Research methodologies are forever evolving (Tamasese et al, 2005, Smith, 1999); 
Pacific people in New Zealand have become part of the professional, educated, 
middle-class as well as leaders within politics, education, sports, church, university, 
law, medicine and the arts. It is because of these individuals, who have paved the 
way for researchers like me, I have a buffet of methodological options to choose 
from to answer my research question. I have selected a series of methodologies 




My research sits in a qualitative research paradigm (Tuafuti, 2011). Qualitative 
research has progressed over time. Traditional academic research was dominated 
by scientific methods (Lichtman, 2006) but researchers such as Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) suggested that research be carried out in natural settings rather than in 
laboratories.  
 
Quantitative studies were traditionally heralded as the preferred methodology in 
academic settings. I am not discrediting this methodology but as we know in 
development ‘one size does not fit all’, and thankfully qualitative research is 
considered just as legitimate. Qualitative research is described by Lichtman, (2006) 
as ‘fluid and ever-changing’.  
 
I have taken two of the three common characteristics about qualitative research from 
Tuafuti (2011) to cement my reasons for choosing this research paradigm. First is 
‘naturalistic inquiry’: “behaviour and the sharing of real-life experiences are best 
understood when they occur in natural settings, as the interpretation and meanings 
of shared experiences rely heavily on contexts” (Tuafuti, 2011, p. 35). My interviews 
took place in both Samoa and New Zealand with Samoans and donor 
representatives. Being in Samoa positions the interviewees in a familiar setting and 
provides context to the local situation.  
 
Secondly ‘collaborative inquiry’ is adopted: the view that all those involved in the 
research are co-researchers and everybody is included with genuine collaboration. 
Collaborative inquiry does not only include those that are being interviewed but also 
fellow researchers. My research will contribute to a larger body of research (Overton 
et al, 2012). Wrighton (2010) carried out a similar research on Tuvalu and I have 
collaborated quite closely with Wrighton (2010) on what worked and did not work for 
her research. This advice has been invaluable to answer my research question.  
 
My methodology is also influenced by Anae et al, (2010) on the Samoan cultural 
concept of teu le va which is being used by the Ministry of Education to address the 
low attrition rate of Pacific children in New Zealand. Teu le va places emphasis on 
working together and sharing power. It makes a conscious effort to move away from 
underachievement but focuses on everyone “taking responsibility for optimising 
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education outcomes for and with Pasifika learners.” (Anae et al, 2010, p. 5). Teu le 
va in fa’aSamoa is about respect and knowing your place. Samoa is very hierarchical 
and in every family there are duties that are carried out by parents, sons and 
daughters. When we grew up we knew our place. If there was a lunch after church 
we knew the routine. The parents always ate first. When they finished, a bowl of 
soapy water was brought to them to wash their hands and their plates were cleared 
away. It was not until the last adult was full that we were allowed to eat. Even after I 
returned with a university degree and I was teaching I was still considered a young 
person. Teu le va is essential when interviewing Government of Samoa officials for 
my research. These are people that are considered very senior in their roles and if I 
am not respectful in my approach interviews will be cut short with no room for 
redemption. Samoans do not like it when people ask questions with ulterior 
motivations. This is deemed as being fiapoto (someone who thinks they know what 
they are talking about but in actual fact do not). I am also mindful of respectful ways 
of addressing my interviewees and, as I speak fluent Samoan, I conducted the 
interviews bilingually.  
 
I acknowledge that the outcomes of this research strongly favour the GoS officials as 
having development policy sovereignty when working with donors. My own cultural 
background may suggest that I show a bias to Samoa. I do not deny that I am proud 
of my heritage and my positionality has clearly influenced my methodology. However 
my findings are a direct reflection of GoS officials and donor interviews that conclude 
the GoS has development policy sovereignty. 
Methods 
The methods that I used for this research were semi structured interviews influenced 
by talanoa; a review of the GoS development policy, and my own observations I 
have made as a researcher.  
Interviews/ Talanoa:  
To explore how the GoS has asserted development sovereignty when dealing with 
donors I chose semi structured interviews. I have blended the established Western 
method of interviewing with talanoa. There is not a lot of literature documented about 
talanoa - which literally means ‘talk’ (Otsuka, 2005). Gegeo (1998) says that talanoa 
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could mean different things to different societies. There are therefore no hard and 
fast rules established around how talanoa is conducted as a research method. 
 
Talanoa means ‘talk’ or ‘discussion’ (Robinson & Robinson, 2005). Vaioleti (2006) 
summarises talanoa as speaking broadly in both a formal and informal manner but 
without a rigid framework. This does not suggest that the content of the conversation 
is not important, in fact I found that when my interviews were not rigid that the 
participants were more willing to share anecdotal information that supported my 
thesis. This is where Vaioleti (2006) suggests that talanoa offers discussions that are 
multilayered and critical to the research.  
 
Relationships are important in talanoa. Otsuka (2006) encourages researchers to 
have good interpersonal relationships with the researched. Otsuka (2006) proposes 
to researchers that through talanoa it moves away from a surface interview process 
but encourages the interviewer to engage emotionally with the interviewee. 
 
I conducted 17 interviews: eight were GoS officials, four from the private sector; one 
from civil society, three from the donor community and one an independent 
researcher. Two of my interviews were conducted in New Zealand and 15 were 
conducted in Samoa.  
 
As a frequent visitor to Samoa and having lived and worked there for one and a half 
years my research in Samoa took place over two weeks. Having a full-time job with a 
busy travel schedule as well as a young family I was only able to afford a two week 
window to undertake my field research. 
 
I was fortunate that I had worked, studied or am related to most of my participants so 
it made it easier for me to connect with people. I had organised all of my interviews 
in Samoa prior to my departure. With good telecommunications in Samoa I was able 
to ring all my participants and follow up with an email confirmation of a time, venue, 
as well as attaching a brief about my topic and consent form (see Appendix 1 and 2). 
I took extra printed copies with me as I know that people are always busy and may 
not have had the chance to read my email prior to my arrival for the interview.  
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From experience if you are not a high level diplomat or a Prime Minister it is 
advisable to organise an interview schedule for countries in the Pacific a week or two 
out from departure. This can be challenging as it poses the risk of no one being 
available for your interviews. However I have learned from wasting countless hours 
and sitting in waiting rooms around the Pacific after having organised a meeting 
schedule a month out from arrival. People are busy in all countries and as I am not a 
VIP the reality is I may not feature on people’s priority list no matter how much I rate 
myself. Booking interviews a week or two from your arrival in-country means that you 
are fresh on the calendar or minds of the participants. To combat the risk of 
participants forgetting their interview times and schedule, I asked for up to date 
mobile numbers to reconfirm appointments once in Samoa. The Digicel mobile 
network is cheap and reliable so most Samoans have a mobile phone. Armed with 
my interview schedule and mobile phone upon arrival in Samoa I called each 
participant the day before their appointments with a friendly reminder. If people were 
not available I simply changed the schedule to suit them.  
 
For Samoans, gatherings are centred on food; I wanted my participants to feel 
relaxed so that I could get some good examples of development sovereignty. Where 
possible I wanted to conduct interviews away from their normal places of work, but 
not all were able to do this so I held meetings at their office space. I conducted the 
majority of my interviews over breakfast, lunch or dinner at either restaurants in town 
or at my parents’ home in Toamua which was vacant at the time. The interviews 
were low key and I wanted to create a comfortable atmosphere for people to relax. If 
I was unknown to the interviewee I was first asked about my parents and their 
villages. Before long both parties were able to establish lineage and connections no 
one else understands. As I knew most of my participants we mixed the interviews 
with general catch-ups. For those that I did not know so well I was keen to establish 
a relationship. A huge part of the interviews was getting to know each other’s 
background. I did not want to ‘use’ the participant for my benefit but I wanted them to 
know that I valued their time and stories. I did not place a time limit on the interviews.  
 
One of my main interviews started at 2pm and finished at 11pm over dinner. I could 
have carried on all night but I was mindful it was a work night for the participant who 
had an extremely busy schedule. I conducted no more than three interviews a day 
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and some interviews were by accident. Whilst catching up with some family and 
friends over meals and being asked about my research topic, stories of development 
sovereignty started to emerge so the catch up ended up becoming an interview with 
participants signing consent forms. This occurred with two different participants, one 
from the private sector and one from the GoS. 
 
As Samoa is a small country I was keen to protect the identity of the participants. 
Each participant was the given the option to remain anonymous. Some chose to for 
the protection of their respective organisations, mainly the donors, while others in 
more senior roles of the GoS were happy to release details of their identity. I decided 
for the sake of each individual, as well to ensure I would not harm existing 
relationships in Samoa, I would keep all identities of my participants anonymous. 
Each participant will be referred to as either GoS (Government of Samoa); PS 
(Private Sector); CSO (Civil Society Organisation); D (Donor) or I (Independent) and 
a number reflecting the order of each interview (Appendix 3). I left out details that 
would identify the person or their organisation, particularly the CSO and donors as it 
would not be difficult to identify who they are being that there is only one CSO 
participant and three donor participants. There were some examples from my 
findings that referred to other countries in the Pacific region, I have been careful not 
to reveal the identity of these countries as it could harm the GoS’s relationships.  
 
All the participants were senior staff within their respective organisations. I had 
prepared a list of questions (see Appendix 4) to guide my interviews and in all cases 
I was flexible in its use. I found that some answers led to other interesting lines of 
enquiry so I pursued a different tangent. All the participants had different 
experiences so I wanted to make sure that I captured this and was not bound by my 
prepared questions. I had become familiar with my line of questioning and by the 
third interview I did not even refer to the questions page. For some interviews I did 
not use the questions at all, particular for the two interviews that were unplanned and 
evolved out of conversations.  
 
It is natural, particularly for educated Samoans and some Samoans that have grown 
up outside of Samoa (if they have learned their mother tongue), to speak in both 
English and Samoan. My interviews with the Samoans participants were therefore 
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conducted bilingually. I have been travelling over the last nine years in the Pacific as 
part of my role at VSA and developed volunteer assignments with partner 
organisations through meetings and taking notes. I therefore decided not to record 
any my interviews but I took notes throughout the interviews being sure to ask the 
participant to repeat lines if I felt I had missed something. As a result I was still able 
to use direct quotes from my participants.  
Review of GoS documentation: 
I looked at a number of the GoS’s documents that are reflected in chapter six. The 
documents were either found on the official Government of Samoa website 
(Government of Samoa, 2012a) or provided to me by GoS officials. These 
documents include: Development Cooperation Policy Partners in Development: 
Promoting Aid Effectiveness; Evaluation of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action; the Millennium Development Goals: 
Second Progress Report. Prepared by the National Task Force with support of the 
UN System; Strategy for the Development of Samoa 2012 – 2016; and two Tsunami 
2009 reports. I also reviewed documents from major donors in Samoa such as the 
New Zealand Aid Programmes Joint Commitments for Development with the GoS. A 
review of the documentation is reflected in chapter six. 
My personal observations: 
As a New Zealand born Samoan I have had a long-standing involvement in the 
Pacific community in New Zealand and the Pacific. In social research terms, I could 
be considered as both an insider and an outsider, exercising objectivity and 
subjectivity. I have intimate knowledge of Samoa which is balanced with an 
evidence-based approach to the research utilising the methods listed above to 
identify my findings. A rigorous process of debate and discussion was part of the 
research process with my supervisor ‘interrogating’ my results to ensure rigour in my 
observations. 
Conclusion 
A number of methodological research approaches have influenced my thesis. I was 
keen to ensure that the Government of Samoa were at the centre of this research. 
Having being been influenced by worldviews, ontology, epistomology and 
positionality I was able to identify a methodology appropriate to my context but also 
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being able to present a credible piece of research. A qualitative methodology was 
most appropriate and understanding the Samoan culture and language played a big 
part in choosing this methodology. The methods chosen were semi-structured 
interviews through talanoa of representatives of the GoS, private sector, CSO, 
donors and independent researchers; reviewing of GoS documentation and my own 
observations as a development practitioner. Through these methods I was able to 





CHAPTER FIVE: The Government of Samoa and Aid 
 
Introduction 
My field research highlighted some very interesting examples of the way the 
Government of Samoa (GoS) asserts their development sovereignty when working 
with donors. To provide contextual background to the findings this chapter will look 
specifically at an overview of the current status of the GoS with specific reference to 
how aid is delivered and managed for Samoa. I will then look at the Samoan 
economy and discuss donor contributions to further build the picture of development 
sovereignty. 
The Government of Samoa 
Samoa is currently governed by the Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP) who has 
been in power since 1982 aside from a brief period between 1986 – 1987 when 
internal differences forced them into a coalition (So'o, 2005). HRPP was set up by 
Vaai Kolone (Samoa’s Prime Minister 1981, 1986-87) in 1979 and was the first 
political party established post-independence (So'o, 2012). There have been several 
different political parties that have been established and have since collapsed. 
Following the 2011 elections, HRPP currently holds 36 seats and the Tautua Party 
13 seats (So'o, 2012).  
 
The current Prime Minister since 1998 and leader of HRPP is Tuila'epa Sailele 
Malielegaoi, the longest serving Prime Minister in both Samoa and the Pacific region. 
Malielegaoi grew up in the village of Lepa (a village on the South Coast that was 
severely affected by the 2009 tsunami). Malielegaoi has a Bachelor of Commerce 
and Master of Commerce from Auckland University. Before Malielegaoi entered 
parliament he was posted to Brussels and worked as a treasury department official 
for the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP). He has also held a position at the World 
Bank gaining familiarity with their financial systems. Malielegaoi’s economics 
background has been reflected in his government portfolios: Minister of Finance, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Minister of Tourism. 
 
Samoa has thirteen government ministries (see appendix 5). Each ministry has a 
Minister elected from Cabinet, a Chief Executive Officer and depending on the size 
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of each Ministry there may be a tier of Deputy Chief Executive Officers. Every 
Ministry has a tier of Assistant Chief Executive Officers, Principal Officers, Senior 
Officers and Officers, the entry level position for recent graduates, as well as 
administration and service staff. All government departments are guided by the 
Strategy for the Development of Samoa.  
 
Any form of Overseas Development Assistance with donors, line ministries, 
government corporations and CSOs in Samoa is coordinated through two 
mechanisms - the Cabinet Development Committee (CDC – revitalised in 1988) and 
the Aid Coordination Committee (ACC) with its operating arm, the Aid & Debt 
Coordination Division of the Ministry of Finance (Government of Samoa, 2010c).  
 
The CDC has a membership of 72 comprising Ministers of Cabinet, Associate 
Ministers, Chief Executive Officers of all government ministries and corporations, 
and a representative of the CSOs. The CDC is chaired by the Prime Minister and the 
Economic Planning and Policy Division of the Ministry of Finance is the secretariat. 
The Cabinet Development Committee appraises all new proposals, approves policy 
frameworks and monitors progress of implementation (Government of Samoa, 
2010b).  
 
The ACC has a membership of seven, is chaired by the Prime Minister and the Aid 
Coordination/Debt Management Division of the Ministry of Finance is its secretariat. 
Its key role is the coordination of all development cooperation in particular the 
allocation of resources should external funding be required (Government of Samoa, 
2010b). 
 
To ensure that aid reaches all sectors in Samoa, the private sector is represented by 
the Chamber of Commerce: “[i]ts main role is to interact with the government on key 
policies affecting the private sector and provide feedback on key strategic areas that 
need development interventions” (Government of Samoa, 2010a, p. 34). The Samoa 
umbrella for NGOs (SUNGO) officially represents CSOs and channels information 




The main functions of the Ministry of Finance are to provide policy and strategic 
advice as well as financial services to support the Strategy for the Development of 
Samoa 2012 – 2016. The Ministry of Finance is divided into three different 
departments and the Aid and Debt Coordination Division sits in the Policy 
Management Department. There is a team of seven staff members managed by a 
very experienced and long serving Assistant CEO. It was felt the Economic Aid 
Division, which sat within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the mid-1980s, was not 
very effective. It was moved to the Ministry of Finance in 2003 as part of a 
restructure and renamed the Aid Coordination and Debt Management Division. The 
Debt Management Unit was established in 2010 as a result of a Medium Term Debt 
Management Strategy. Initially positions for the unit were to be filled externally by a 
contracted position, however the tenders were too expensive and the Ministry of 
Finance realised it had the experience to “develop in house capacity to monitor the 
overall level of Government debt including, domestic and external debt ... for which 
Government is responsible, and to undertake debt sustainability and risk analysis” 
(Government of Samoa, 2011a). 
The economy of Samoa 
Samoa’s economy is based on subsistence living with trade based on a system of 
reciprocity that includes all levels of the Samoan social hierarchy (Claessen & van de 
Velde, 1991). This is supplemented and interconnected with a long established and 
expanding market economy. 
 
Western influences have impacted the Samoa economy in a major way. Capitalism, 
colonialism and the world market system were introduced alongside the advent of 
new diseases, alcohol, firearms, the coconut oil and copra trade, the labour trade, 
the introduction of wage employment, and the establishment of colonial 
administrations. The result has been a modern economic sector dominated by 
Europeans and monopolised by immigrant Asians. In many ways Samoa was 
fortunate in that it lacked mineral resources, had limited land, very small markets, 
and was protected by missionaries and administrations. These conditions coupled 
with a strong social structure that has been reasonably unchanged meant they were 
relatively left alone by foreign interests (Watters, 2008). The strength of fa’aSamoa 
that clashed with Western economic systems acted as a protector of the Samoa 
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economy. “The narrow scope for individual enterprise in a Samoan-type society has 
been criticised by economists and geographers who note that the matai system 
inhibitied social deviancy, discouraging innovation or the accumulation of individual 
savings” (Watters, 2008, p. 62). 
 
Since independence the Samoan economy has been fairly dependent on aid, 
reinforcing Bertram and Watters (1985) MIRAB theory that claims “remittances and 
foreign aid are the main economic resources of the local economy” (Poirine, 1998, p. 
65). When Samoa became independent many Samoans took advantage of 
employment opportunites in New Zealand, helping the New Zealand economy with its 
labour shortage and assisting families back in Samoa with the “desired cash income 
because of their increasingly cash-based economy” (Va'a et al, 2012, p. 107).  
 
My father and his three brothers moved to New Zealand during the 1960’s. My father 
repeatedly told us of the story of keeping a third of his weekly pay to live on and 
sending the rest to his father in Samoa to clothe and feed the aiga. I believe his 
intention for telling the story was for us to do the same once we started working. It 
became the desired option for most Samoans to move to New Zealand for a better 
life.  
 
The GoS since independence has striven to manage the impact of Western 
influences on their comparitively small community (OECD, 2011). Samoa has had a 
series of Five Year Development Plans dating as far back as 1966. The earlier plans 
1966-1970 and 1971-1975 focussed on the building of Apia town and its supporting 
infrastructure including the wharf, airport, telecommunications services, electicity and 
water supply (Va'a et al, 2012). It is estimated that 52% of the current population live 
in the Apia town area today (2006 Census). Agricultural development was the 
backbone of the Samoa economy as reflected by the German DHPG plantations in 
the late 1800s. The now University of the South Pacific (USP) Alafua campus 
specialising on agricultural development was set up in 1966 to “accelerate the 
training of agricultural specialists” (Va'a et al, 2012, p. 97). 
 
In 1971 Samoa was classified by the UN as a ‘Least Developed Country” (LDC)’ but 
is expected to graduate to ‘Developing Country’ status by 2014 (Community Scoop, 
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2012). As part of the LDC classification Samoa welcomed a large number of donors 
to its shores including multilateral institutions such UNDP and the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). These donors provided significant funds to the Samoa economy, 
assisting to end a “25-year period of little economic change” (Va'a et al, 2012, p. 
108).   
 
From 1976 to 1980 the focus of the development plans was agricultural export 
production and tourism to encourage foreign exchange which enabled the 
importation of consumer goods.  Tourism was inspired by the 1983 South Pacific 
Games with more infrastructure development (Va'a, Va’a, Fuata'i, Chan Mow, & 
Amosa, 2012).   
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) entered the scene in the early 1980s when 
Samoa’s economy was looking grim with the prices of its major export crops (copra 
and cocoa) being unstable in the world markets and impacting on exports (World 
Bank, 1991). The Samoan economy was not in a good way failing reviews from the 
World Bank due to significant economic mismanagement of funds by public 
servants (World Bank, 1991). As a result “[f]rom 1989, Samoa embarked on a 
number of reforms to encourage growth of the private sector and foreign 
investment. The programme of privatisation and corporatisation concentrated on a 
few operations with investor potential, most notably the telecommunications sector” 
(Va'a et al, 2012, p. 109). As part of privatisation Yazaki EDS Samoa (a wiring 
harness manufacturing plant) was set up in 1991, employing up to 1000 Samoans 
and turning over approximately 110 million Samoan tala per annum, therefore 
providing considerable net income to the Samoan economy (Yazaki, 2010; Pacific 
Islands Trade and Invest, 2009) 
 
The cyclones in 1990 (Ofa) and 1991 (Val) and the 1993 collapse of Samoa’s 
leading export crop (taro) due to an introduced leaf blight have had severe 
economic impacts on Samoa with a decline of approximately 50% of Samoa’s GDP 
between 1989–1991 (World Bank, 1991). Aid coordination and aid effectiveness 
terms were used with even more donors assisting with disaster relief and continued 
development work. In the 1990s the GoS put in place economic reforms “including 
the liberalisation of exchange controls and the institutionalisation of strategic 
67 
 
planning” (Va'a et al, 2012, p. 110). The European Union became a player in 
Samoa’s economy during the 1990s.  
 
A major earthquake in 2009 measuring 8.5 on the Richter scale precipitated the 
tsunami that followed, claiming the lives of 143 people. This cost the country over 
20% of GDP recovering infrastructure, resettling communities and re-establishing 
services to the affected areas. It was reported that 850 households spread over 51 
villages were affected by the tsunami (Government of Samoa, 2010c). Tourism was 
directly impacted by the tsunami which damaged 25% of Samoa’s tourist 
accommodation.  
 
Samoa’s current economy is dependent on tourism, agriculture, fisheries, remittances 
and external development assistance (Government of Samoa, 2010b). Between 
2000 and 2011 remittances averaged about 23.6% of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) amounting to SAT$348.4 million (Government of Samoa, 2012). Tourism 
made SAT$297.4 million which was 20.1% of GDP. By comparison external 
development assistance and concessionary lending in the 2010/2011 financial year 
made up 37% of the Government of Samoa budget (NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, 2012). 
 
Samoa’s major exports are fresh fish, coconut oil and cream, copra and nonu juice 
which amount to approximately SAT$30.4 million per annum (Government of 
Samoa, 2011). Samoa imports a large amount of food items, petrol and 
manufactured goods (Government of Samoa, 2010b). Economic growth is a priority 
area for the Strategy for the Development of Samoa (SDS) (2012) that is driven by 
commerce, transport, communications and construction (Government of Samoa, 
2010b).  
 
Samoa’s GDP in 2011 was US$505.8 million with a composition of 10% primary 
sector, 22% secondary and 68% tertiary. GDP per capita in 2009 was US$3,121. 
Samoa ranks 99th of 187 in the Medium Human Development Index in 2011 up five 
places since 2010. Figure 4 below reflects the amount of funding per donor, 
showcasing the huge contribution of aid to Samoa. “This increase reflects Samoa’s 
increased capacity to effectively utilise ODA, increased confidence by donors in 
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Samoa’s political, economic and social stability, as well as donor responses to 
disasters such as the 2009 tsunami” (Government of Samoa, 2010, p. 31).  
Figure 4: ODA from Donors in Samoa  
SAMOA 
Receipts 2008 2009 2010 
Net ODA (USD Million) 40 77 147 
Bilateral share (gross ODA) 59% 56% 58% 
Net ODA/ GNI 7.2% 16.1% 27.1% 
Net Private flows (USD million) 38 12 22 
 
For reference 2008 2009 2010 
Population (million) 0.2 0.2 0.2 
GNI per capita (Atlas USD) 2880 270 2860 
Source: (OECD, 2011) 
Donors 
Samoa receives aid from around 23 donors in the form cash grants, soft term loans, 
in-kind grants, and technical support from volunteer sending agencies such as 
Volunteer Service Abroad and the US Peace Corps (Government of Samoa, 2011a). 
Aid effectiveness and the principles of the Paris Declaration (2005) guide Samoa’s 
interactions with donors.  
 
Since independence New Zealand has been a major bilateral6 donor to Samoa, 
along with Australia, Japan, and China. All four bilateral donors have offices in 
Samoa. There are six key multilateral7 donors operating in Samoa, the World Bank - 
administered from Australia, Asian Development Bank – administered from Fiji and 
Australia, the United Nations Development Program, World Health Organisation 
(WHO) (which both have offices in Samoa), the European Commission (EC), and 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) who Samoa has recently 
re-engaged with. The International Monetary Fund has been involved in Samoa 
since the early 1980s (Government of Samoa, 2010a). 
 
Figure 5 below shows the top ten donors in Samoa and their contribution to the 
Samoa budget between 2009–2010.  
                                                          
6
 Bilateral refers to aid given from one country to another country. 
7
 Multilateral refers to aid given from two or more countries. 
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Figure 5: Top 10 donors of gross ODA to Samoa 
 2009-10 average USD m 
1 Australia 30 
2 Japan 21 
3 ADB Special Funds 19 
4  New Zealand 14 
5 IDA (International Development Agency) 14 
6 EU Institutions 10 
7 IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) 4 
8 GEF 2 
9 United States 1 
10 UNDP 1 
 Source: (OECD, 2011) 
 
There are a number of regional organisations based in Samoa: Food Agricultural 
Organisation (FAO); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO); European Union (EU); Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment 
Programme (SPREP) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
(Government of Samoa, 2011b). 
 
Figure 6 provides a snapshot of the development funding to Samoa based on 2005 
and 2010 statistics. The figures highlight an increase in ODA between these periods.  
Figure 6: Development Funding 
Type of 
Development 
Domestic Source (SAT) External Source (SAT) Key Sectors 
 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 
Capital 41.41m 60.55m 605.68m 855.05m Construction Electricity 
Technical 
Assistance 





2.47m 7.19m 34.57m 116.22m   
Totals 59.81m 90.22m 811.29m 1585.34m   
Source: (Government of Samoa, 2010a, p. 30) 
 
I worked in Samoa from 2002 – 2003 for the New Zealand aid programme managing 
the scholarships scheme. It was at this time that the GoS recognised it was 
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shouldering a large administrative burden due to the Pacific Regional Awards8 
offered by New Zealand and Australia. The Pacific Regional Awards were similar but 
the GoS was expected to complete two different reporting systems and manage the 
awards using two different guidelines. This was an early example of development 
policy sovereignty. Work started in early 2003 to harmonise both procedures and 
limit the duplication of work by the GoS Scholarships Division of the Ministry of 
Foreign and Trade. Modalities of aid delivery have shifted significantly since 2003, 
“[a]ll bilateral donors (apart from China and Japan), the EU and the UN agencies use 
Samoa’s own country systems to varying degrees” (Government of Samoa, 2010a, 
p. 37). 
 
High level talks to discuss the commitments of donors are undertaken annually with 
a mid-term review factored in to discuss progress and challenges. The GoS holds 
quarterly aid consultation meetings in-country with all donors. Some donors such as 
New Zealand and Australia have developed joint commitments with the GoS. This is 
a move away from longer documentation that is never read or understood to shorter 
(eight page) summaries of a shared vision for achieving long-term development 
outcomes.  
The major factors supporting this shift to joint assistance strategies by New Zealand and 
Australia have been their historical involvement with aid programming in Samoa, the 
synergies in the areas they selected to be involved in, the similarity in their systems and 
processes, and their familiarity with the constraints in the government’s systems and 
processes” (Government of Samoa, 2010a, p. 46).  
In the early to mid-90s a public sector reform programme was undertaken to improve 
the GoS’s systems.  
 
In 2006 a review of the GoS’s Public Financial Management (PFM) was undertaken 
over two weeks by external consultants using the internationally recognised Public 
Expenditure Financial Accounting (PEFA) methodology. Reviews of this nature are 
undertaken every three years to monitor the robustness of developing countries’ 
PFMs.  The outcome of the review was not accepted by the GoS based on the time 
                                                          
8
 In 2001 the Pacific Regional Awards refer to scholarships offered by the New Zealand and Australian 
Governments to students that have successfully completed their University Preparatory year at the National 
University of Samoa. The recipients of the awards are based on the students overall grade and their academic 
ranking against other students of the same year.   
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spent by consultant’s in-country and the lack of consultation with relevant 
stakeholders to provide contextual advice. In 2009 the GoS undertook a self-
assessment with workshops and meetings with a large number of stakeholders. The 
findings showed that although there are a number of areas that could do with 
improvement, the GoS PFM is fairly comprehensive and transparent. Evidence of the 
successful impact of Institutional Strengthening Programmes (ISP) assists in the 
improvement of the GoS PFM.  
 
As Samoa has a relatively robust financial system donors feel confident in the use of 
the GoS PFM. Several donors such as AusAID and the New Zealand aid programme 
are using more elements of government systems, but other major donors including 
China and the EU currently use only their own systems. Both the WB and the ADB 
require additional approval for purchases above a certain amount (Government of 
Samoa, 2011a, p. VI). Budget support continues to be the modality that some argue 
as the Mecca of all aid modalities (Lister & Nyamugasira, 2003). The fairly robust 
GoS PFM is a contributing factor for the EU providing 85% of its assistance in the 
form of sector budget support for the 2009/10 financial year (Government of Samoa, 
2011a). The GoS received five million dollars from Australia and one million from 
New Zealand in sector budget support (Simi, 2012).  
Conclusion 
This chapter lays a foundation for this research findings and has outlined the 
structure of the GoS and how aid is managed. There has been particular attention 
paid to the Samoan economy to build a picture of the huge contribution aid has on 
the GoS budget. It also highlights what was happening on an international scale 
economically at the time and how this has impacted the GoS. Samoa does not have 
any real mineral resources or land which has made them less of a target to foreign 
investors. As a result Samoa has been able to retain its culture and traditions of 
fa’aSamoa leading to a relatively positive relationship with donors. The GoS has 
proven to donors, through its systems and processes, it is a  trustworthy aid 
recipient. It has learnt from past mistakes and now has a  well educated and well 
informed public service which, this research will show, has development sovereignty 




CHAPTER SIX: GoS sovereignty through development policy 
 
Introduction 
From the research findings it was highlighted that the GoS has implemented 
development policy into its aid programme. This chapter will start by looking at 
Samoa’s involvement with development policy on a global scale, the GoS’s 
involvement in development policy on a regional scale and then finally look at how 
the GoS has implemented development policy on a national scale. The aim of this 
chapter is to provide examples of how the GoS asserts its development sovereignty 
through policy and how the GoS engages with the global level and translates this 
into its own policy. 
Development Policy Globally 
As mentioned in chapter two, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), the 
Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Co-operation (2011) were key high level forums that aimed to 
strengthen the partnership between donors and recipient governments. The main 
objective of the forums was to make aid more effective leading to improved 
development work. The GoS did not formally endorse the Paris Declaration until 
2008 (just before the Accra Agenda for Action summit) but the Paris Declaration 
legitimised its government reform agenda that had started in the early ‘90s 
(Government of Samoa, 2010a).  
 
The GoS took part in an independent evaluation of the implementation of the Paris 
Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action in the Samoan context in 2010. The 
evaluation was undertaken by local and overseas consultants as a global appraisal 
of international aid since 2005. The evaluation helped to identify whether signatories 
of the Paris Declaration working in Samoa were meeting their commitments (OECD, 
2011c). The evaluation included a wide representation of all sectors within Samoa 
and the results, although not perfect, indicated the GoS was on the right track to 
meet the five Paris Declaration principles (see chapter 2). The GoS is much further 
ahead in the first three principles of the Paris Declaration than the last two. Each of 
the five principles in Samoa can be summarised as follows. 
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GoS and the principles of the Paris Declaration 
Ownership: As reflected in the previous chapter the GoS accepts and places a huge 
importance on the ownership of its development. What the Paris Declaration has 
provided is a tool that has enabled the GoS to hold donors accountable, ensuring 
that their assistance is in line with the GoS priority development areas. As will be 
reflected by comments below, donors are becoming increasingly respectful of the 
GoS owning its development. This is reflected in the donors’ use of the GoS’s 
Medium-term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) as well as donors coordinating their 
assistance to support the Samoa Development Strategy and moving away from 
project based development (Government of Samoa, 2010a). 
 
Alignment: Like many developing countries the GoS’s long-term aim is for all 
development funds to be delivered as budget support. There is still a long way to go 
before donors align to one system and process for implementing the development 
programmes. Although some donors, such as the European Union and Australia, 
have shown great willingness to trust the GoS’s systems, others, such as multilateral 
banks, are more reluctant displaying varying levels of confidence. While it can be 
risky for donors to use the GoS’s systems for procurement, if the systems prove to 
be legitimate, transparent and accountable, it would be less time consuming and 
taxing on public servants if all donors aligned to a single system. As a result the GoS 
“sees the Paris Declaration’s commitment to alignment as an opportunity to focus on 
its own development, acknowledging that its systems, while adequate, will continue 
to improve with on-going scrutiny and capacity building support” (Government of 
Samoa, 2010a, p. 68) 
 
Harmonisation: When donors work together on a common development programme 
there is usually a ‘lead donor’ that deals with the partner government to avoid 
duplication of information by the recipient government. This is reflected in a World 
Health Organisation SWAp in Kenya, Malawi and Tanzania in 2001 where the Swiss 
Development Cooperation (SDC) was given a lead donor role (WHO, 2001). 
Interestingly the GoS has stated in its evaluation of the Paris Declaration that 
“Samoa does not accept the term ‘lead donor’, its view is that the government is the 
leader of all development in Samoa” (Government of Samoa, 2010a, p. 68). The 
term ‘coordinaing development partner’ is used instead and the decision is made by 
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the donors who are funding similar sectors on who becomes the coordinating 
development partner. 
 
As mentioned there are some donor supported programmes where the GoS financial 
systems are deemed unacceptable by donors. In these cases donors use one 
system (usually a multilateral agency) for procurement. “In health this is the World 
Bank system; in power it is the Asian Development Bank system” (Government of 
Samoa,  2010a, p. 683) 
 
The GoS also has a missions calendar. At the start of every calendar year donors 
are asked to provide annual mission plans to the ACEO of the Aid Coordination Debt 
Management Division. Donors coordinate mission trips to avoid dupication for the 
GoS. The mission’s calendar helps the GoS avoid overwhelming and unnecessary 
visits from donor missions.  
 
Managing for results: Donors rightly need to account for their funding and, as the 
European Union has led the way for budget support, this is based on a 
“demonstrated commitment to managing for results” (Government of Samoa, 2010a, 
p. 69). The GoS has a monitoring and evaluation framework as part of its Samoa 
Development Strategy. 
  
Mutual accountability: This principle ensures that both the GoS and donors are 
accountable for development results (OECD,  2005). Understanding of the principles 
of the Paris Declaration is slowly reaching all sectors of Samoa. Certainly those who 
I met with for interviews from public, private and CSO were all familiar with the Paris 
Declaration which showed a change from the evaluation report of 2010. The GoS is 
working on building “mechanisms for mutual accountability into partnership 
agreements and program plans” (Government of Samoa, 2010a, p. 70).  
GoS and the Millennium Development Goals 
The GoS signed up to the MDGs in 2000 recognising their importance in assisting 
the development of Samoa. In 2005 the MDGs were fully integrated into specific 
targets of the Strategy for the Development of Samoa 2005-2007 and 2008-2012; as 
well as all sector and corporate plans. The GoS has a National MDG Taskforce 
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chaired by the MoF and includes key stakeholders from public and CSOs. The GoS 
charged the taskforce with completing two MDG reports; the first in 2004 that 
“assisted to generate and enhance awareness among all development stakeholders 
of the importance of reaching these goal” (Government of Samoa, 2010b, p. 13) and 
the second in 2010 that “contextualizes the MDGs to reflect Samoan realities and 
provides a more diagnostic approach to the country situation including the 
identification of major challenges in the pursuit of the MDGs” (Government of 
Samoa, 2010b, p. 13). 
 
The main results of the 2004 report highlighted positive outcomes in health and 
education but raised concerns about women’s empowerment and the environment. 
Since the SDS 2005 – 2007 the MDGs has been fully integrated into all sector and 
corporate plans. The 2010 report’s findings show that Samoa is well on its way to 
achieving the MDGs by 2015 with good progress on extreme poverty (MDG1); child 
mortality (MDG4); maternal health (MDG5) and universal primary education (MDG2). 
Setbacks from the 2009 tsunami and the impacts of climate change pose a 
challenge to meet the environmental sustainability goal (MDG7). Samoa has strongly 
benefited from having regional organisations such as SPREP based in Apia to 
support the GoS’s domestic policies and strategies (Government of Samoa, 2010b). 
Along with the support from CSOs through church groups, village matai and donors, 
stronger effort is needed on MDG3 to promote gender equality and empower 
women, “especially when it comes to promoting women’s representation in 
Parliament and addressing the issue of violence against women definitely requires 
stronger efforts in order to be achieved” (Government of Samoa, 2010b, p. 62). 
South-South Cooperation and Capacity Development Programme 
Over the past decade the GoS has received capacity building opportunities for 
public, private and CSO mid-level managers to share and exchange experiences in 
order to improve their processes and procedures. The initiative is supported by 
UNDP. Samoa has received assistance in enhancing its aid effectiveness; aid 
coordination and outcomes performance-based budgeting from other similar 
development countries. The idea is to tailor experiences learned from other countries 
to a Samoan context and the results have seen an improvement in the human 
resources in Samoa. This, in turn, improves the provision of sound economic and 
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social advice on Samoa’s development status. Samoa is also a trainer under the 
South-South Cooperation and Capacity Development Programme for other countries 
in the Pacific region. The South-South cooperation complements the GoS interaction 
with donors learning from experiences and therefore not repeating mistakes made by 
other developing countries.  
Development Policy Regionally 
The GoS has been an active member of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) 
and, on a regional scale, has been very active in its involvement in development 
policy throughout the Pacific. Through PIFS leaders of regional governments agreed 
to work collaboratively through the Pacific Plan (2005). The main objective of the 
plan is to guide and strengthen regional cooperation to “[e]nhance and stimulate 
economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and security for 
Pacific countries through regionalism” (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2005). The 
Pacific Plan is a living document so that it can adapt to the changing nature of the 
region. At a regional level PIFS has encouraged principles of the Paris Declaration 
and has been able to enforce this through regional policy.  
Cairns Compact  
The Cairns Compact was agreed to by PIFS leaders at a meeting in Cairns in August 
2009. In line with international aid effectiveness best practice, as reflected through 
the Paris Declaration; Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Partnership, the 
Compact sets out collective actions to strengthen coordination with donors and 
recipients of all development resources (Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, 2009). The 
Compact aims to assist in increasing the economic and development performance of 
PIFS members by working collaboratively and learning from respective country 
experiences. Although the Pacific is in a better position to meet the targets of the 
MDGs (Government of Samoa, 2010b) there is still much work needed to support the 
more vulnerable states within the region. 
 
The Compact is guided by a set of agreed principles to encourage aid effectiveness:  
 a recognition that broad-based, private sector-led growth was essential to 
achieving faster development progress and that donors should encourage the 
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private sector, including through micro-finance and support for larger-scale private 
sector projects; 
 a recognition that improved governance and service delivery are essential to 
achieving faster development progress; 
 a recognition that greater investment in infrastructure would underpin greater 
economic development; 
 an acknowledgement that country leadership, mutual accountability and mutual 
responsibility between Forum Island countries and their development partners are 
fundamental to successful development outcomes; 
 the need to draw on international best-practice as expressed in the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action; and  
 a revitalised commitment to the achievement of the MDGs in the Pacific. 
 
A key feature of the Cairns compact is peer reviews, similar to the South-South 
Cooperation and Capacity Development Programme. Peer reviews assist in mutual 
learning not only between regional governments but also donors. The peer review is 
not seen as a threatening feature but aims to enhance the capacity of regional 
countries and the management of their development resources. The reviews are 
carried out by four PIFS country representatives, donors and other stakeholders. 
There have been a number of reviews that have taken place since 2009 (Pacific 
Island Forum Secretariat, 2009). The GoS have been a part of the peer review of the 
Government of Niue in July 2011 and the Government of Vanuatu in August 2011 
(Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2011a; 2011b). All peer reviews are done in 
consultation with the respective governments.  
 
The GoS is committed to the Compact in its efforts to improve not only its national 
development outcomes but that of the region. It will take time to develop further but 
is a step in the right direction in realising the principles of the Paris Declaration are 
achieved.  
Development Policy Locally 
The GoS has used development policy globally and regionally to implement 
development policy locally ensuring the principles of aid effectiveness are reflected 
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in all its development work. These policies have evolved over time and are 
supported by all sectors of Samoa.   
Strategy for the Development of Samoa (SDS) 
Perhaps the most crucial GoS development policy is the Strategy for the 
Development of Samoa (SDS). The SDS has a four year cycle and the current SDS 
2012 – 2016 is the sixth SDS document that has changed from the calendar year to 
aligning with the fiscal year. The SDS is the national strategic plan and sets out 
Samoa’s development needs and goals as well as the strategies to achieve them. 
The SDS 2012 – 2016 is managed by the Economic Policy and Planning Division of 
the Ministry of Finance. There is wide consultation with public, private and CSOs 
including church and community groups. The SDS is designed and delivered by 
Samoans for Samoans (Government of Samoa, 2012b).   
 
The vision of the SDS 2012 - 2016 is ‘improved quality of life for all’ with an 
underlying theme ‘boosting productivity for sustainable development’, and relies on 
the effective implementation of development work within Samoa. 
 
Each priority area covers key sectors which is a shift in the government approach 
from past experiences. Each sector has a sector plan to guide donors in 
development programmes. The SDS 2012 – 2016 is linked to the MDGs, the Paris 
Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Partnership as well as the 
regional plans on aid effectiveness. All government departments, private sector, 
CSOs, and donors link their development work back to the SDS and it has become 
the key guiding document for the GoS.  
 
The economic sector is a priority area for Samoa. In the SDS 2008 – 2012 the 
Samoan economy did not achieve its macroeconomic targets with a decline in GDP 
by an average of 0.7% per annum. Factors that led to this decline were the economic 
recession and a resulting decline in remittances that traditionally made up 24% of 
GNI, due to rising unemployment amongst the Samoa diaspora abroad. The SDS 
2012 – 2016 focuses on the strengths of Samoa through agriculture using 
organisations such as the Scientific Research Organisation of Samoa (SROS) 
whose key role is to boost value added processes within the sector to further 
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facilitate import substitution. SROS has already developed avocado oil for Samoa 
and more recently started to develop gluten free breadfruit flour, initiatives SROS 
hopes to sell to the private sector to assist in the further development of Samoa 
(Government of Samoa, 2012b).  
 
Sustainable tourism is an area that brings in over 20% of the GDP. The GoS 
recognises the large number of visitors (both Samoan and expatriate) that visit 
Samoa every year. Encouragement of tourism ventures such as the popular beach 
fale (unique to Samoa) is an initiative supported by the Samoa Tourism Authority. 
Tourism training provided by outfits such as the Small Business Enterprise Centre 
give entrepreneurs the opportunity to improve their services. The 2009 tsunami 
destroyed 13% of the sector and the GoS as well as donors recognise the huge 
financial contribution tourism has made to the economy. Donors such as New 
Zealand have committed up to NZ$20 million to the tourism sector over the next five 
years from 2011/2012 (New Zealand & Samoa, 2011) . This is an indication that 
donors align their assistance to the development needs of Samoa.  
 
The SDS is prepared by Samoa and it has taken into account all donor assistance 
when developing the document. The GoS is strategic in that it knows who amongst 
donors can support what areas. Obviously not all donors can cover every sector, for 
example the New Zealand aid programme seldom commits to infrastructure projects 
but this is a focus for the Chinese government. Priority area 3: Infrastructure sector is 
therefore a part of the SDS 2012 – 2016 that the Chinese will focus on. Each donor 
is able to slot into areas of the SDS 2012 – 2016 that is specific to its respective 
donor priorities. By doing so the GoS has provided a buffet menu that suits all tastes 
and budgets, while still being in control of its own development. 
The Development Cooperation Policy 
Samoa’s first aid policy was developed and passed by Cabinet in 2010 based on 
mutual agreement between donors and the GoS. The Development Cooperation 
Policy places the GoS as the leaders and owners of all development work for the 
country and for donors to respect the GoS’s decisions in setting national priorities. 
Furthermore the policy asks donors to use the GoS’s procedures and systems to 
limit the time spent on the varying accounting and reporting systems of the different 
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donors. The process was not only time consuming but left public servants feeling 
overwhelmed and unproductive resulting in poorly completed reports. All donors in 
Samoa know and understand the policy and it is well written with links to the MDGs; 
Paris Declaration, Accra Agenda for Action and Busan Partnership.       
Structural Adjustment Programmes 
SAPs were a feature of the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. The GoS, through 
multilateral institutions, was encouraged to introduce the reform programmes to 
service foreign debts. Kerslake (2007) as part of her thesis on SAPs in Samoa 
highlights the privatisation of the former Department of Works due to 
mismanagement of funds, poor performance from staff and high level corruption. The 
GoS was embarrassed by the Chief Auditor’s report of the former department and 
were left with very little option but to start the privatisation process. Reviews were 
undertaken by external and internal consultants and the results favoured the 
disestablishment of positions and the department becoming the current Ministry of 
Works, Transport and Infrastructure with a lot of its non core functions tendered to 
private enterprises. The free market reforms had hoped to combat practices of 
corruption and nepotism as outlined in the Chief Auditor’s report. Although the 
restructuring was successful, partly due to the fact the consultants worked within a 
culturally appropriate way when redundancies were made, Kerslake (2007) found 
strong evidence former employees of the Department of Works felt victimised by the 
privatisation programme.  
Sector Wide Approaches 
SWAps became the preferred aid modality for the GoS when the SDS focussed on 
sectors. As a result of SWAps there has been a shift from 100% of donor funding 
delivered through project-based modalities prior to 2005 to 74% in 2010 channelled 
through sector programmes (Government of Samoa, 2010a). Under SWAps, “there 
has been a significant increase in the volume of aid pooled by donors. It is 
anticipated that there will be significant savings from reduced transaction costs as a 
result of the new framework for delivering aid, especially through budget support (as 
used by the EU for the water sector) and the use of country systems” (Government 
of Samoa, 2010a, p. 42). Donors are working more collaboratively with the GoS and 
other donors as is reflected in Figure 7 below taken from the GoS’s 2010 statistics.  
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AusAID, NZ, WHO, WB, ADB, JICA and EU use the same reporting format to 
monitor and evaluate the SWAps for each key sector they work in.   
 





Division of Labour 
Health NZ WHO; Aus; 
WB; UN 
Three donors contribute to pooled
9
 resources for sector 
program. UN contributes to specific areas of the sector 
program relevant to its respective mandates. For 
donors in pooled arrangements, ADB, manages 
finances in collaboration with GoS and applies use of 
Bank systems for contracts. Operates under Joint 
Partnership agreement. Delegated responsibility 
between Australia and New Zealand.  
Education Australia NZ, ADB, 
UN 
Again a pooled financing arrangement with ADB tasked 
with overall financial management in collaboration with 
GoS. Use of bank systems for procurement as well 
those of GoS. Operates under joint partnership 
agreement. Delegated responsibility between Australia 
and New Zealand.  
Community 
Development 
Australia EU, NZ Again a pooled arrangement to set up a Community 
Support Facility. Australia is supporting the 
administrative set up with NZ looking at capacity 
development and the EU to provide financing for 
community initiatives.  
Private Sector 
– Tourism 
NZ UN, ADB Donors provide support to common fund under the 
Private Sector Support Facility which includes support 
for tourism. 
(Government of Samoa, 2010a) 
Conclusion 
At the international level the GoS has embraced the new global aid agenda as 
reflected in the evaluation of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action in 
2010. Although the GoS did not endorse the Paris Declaration until 2008 it was 
already well underway on a government reform that reflected the principles of the 
Paris Declaration. The implementation of SAPs, SWAps and MDGs are examples of 
how international best practice is implemented in Samoa.  The SDS 2012 -2016 is a 
good example of how the GoS has taken the global agenda but shaped this to local 
needs. The SDS 2012 – 2016 also takes into account donor assistance and the 
focus for their respective governments. Through the GoS development policy it is 
                                                          
9
 “The use of common pooled financing arrangements is a way to ensure that there is harmonisation of the 
financing resources that will eventually be aligned to country systems. In the case of the sector programs where 
the multilateral financial institutions are involved (namely education and health) the donors have deferred to 
using the procurement systems of the banks rather than the GoS. Challenges remain in terms of harmonisation, 
alignment; results based management and mutual accountability in varying degrees with alignment the most 
challenging for the partners, especially in moving to using government systems and processes fully. Results 
based management and mutual accountability is work in progress” (Government of Samoa, 2010a, p. 47). 
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evident that they have a good understanding of High Level Aid Effectiveness 
changes and adapted these to suit their cultural context. This is a key finding as to 




CHAPTER SEVEN: Markers of development sovereignty 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is the core of this thesis and sets out the findings from the research. 
The  foundation of the thesis is the interviews with a range of different people from 
public service, private enterprise, CSOs, donors and independent representatives in 
both Samoa and beyond. At the completion of the reaserch I left Samoa feeling 
confident that the GoS really does have development sovereignty when dealing with 
donors. I found the local Samoans that I interviewed were of a high calibre; 
educated, well informed, confident individuals who were not afraid to speak their 
minds. This chapter looks at the ‘markers of development sovereignty’ highlighting 
many examples of how the GoS asserts its development sovereignty when dealing 
with donors. I provide examples from both the recipeients’ and donors’ experiences.  
Markers of Development Sovereignty 
Whilst the motivations and intentions from the Paris Declaration, were to make aid 
more effective for its recipents, there are always ulterior motives as  donors are 
guided by their constituencies. The GoS’s donors have varying levels of 
implementation of the Paris Declaration. Some are more accepting of the declaration 
than others as shown in the GoS evaluation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra 
Agenda for Action (Government of Samoa, 2010a). One thing that stood out from my 
research is that Samoans (public, private and CSOs) were unified in their approach 
when dealing with donors. They subscribe to similar views and approaches and have 
developed strong relationships with donors that allows the GoS to be sovereign in 
the delivery of aid to Samoa.  
Educated Samoans 
While I was growing up as a first generation New Zealand-born Samoan, most of the 
adults I knew from my extended family, church and community worked in factories 
with only a handful holding positions as teachers, nurses and office jobs. The 
ultimate intention for early Samoan immigrants was for my generation to excel at 
school and gain university qualifications and therefore better jobs that my parent’s 




Moving to Samoa in 2002 to work was an eye opener for me. I recall my first 
symposium I was asked to attend on behalf of my then manager was held at the 
National University of Samoa on the Samoa curriculum of which New Zealand was a 
major donor. The proceedings opened with devotion. Although I was accustomed to 
this in a typical church setting, this was a professional setting. We sung a common 
hymn from the Congregational Christian Church of Samoa hymn book ‘Fa’afetai i le 
Atua’ in beautiful four part harmonies with no rehearsal. It reminded me of my 
childhood in so many ways. The symposium then moved on to the formalities with 
different speakers from the then Ministry of Education talking to the new curriculum 
in articulate Samoan and English. It was the first time that I had really seen my 
parent’s generation outside of a church setting speaking with confidence on strands 
and objectives of the Samoa curriculum. I came away feeling proud to be Samoan 
and continued witnessing a high calibre of well educated people throughout my year 
and a half working in Samoa.  
 
I was therefore not surprised when undertaking my research in Samoa to encounter 
a strong workforce of confident and articulate government staff. All of the local staff I 
interviewed at least held undergraduate degrees with some holding post graduate 
qualifications to PhD level. University qualifications were gained from institutions 
within the Pacific region or internationally.  
 
The GoS places a major emphasis on educating local people. When I worked for the 
New Zealand High Commission in 2002, at least half of the New Zealand aid budget 
was spent on scholarships alone. The GoS had instituted a bond scheme that meant 
graduates had to serve the GoS (for the length of the time they studied) once they 
had successfully completed their studies. This stopped the GoS losing their 
graduates to competitive salaries internationally. GoS5 said “Scholarships are based 
on the priority needs of the country. There are four types of scholarships, 
undergraduate, post graduate, vocational and mature age. There are scholarships 
set aside for the University Preparatory Year and another for everyone else, civil 




The GoS recognises the importance for maintaining a scholarship programme, “You 
can have all the development programmes but if you don’t have a qualified, 
experienced workforce, it’s a waste of time” (GoS4). GoS4 also went on to say “there 
is a large investment by donors on scholarships and training. As a result 
Government of Samoa has a very qualified and capable workforce, and human 
resources has developed with relevant skills and know-how. Donors can see a 
qualified workforce to carry out the development needs of Samoa”. 
 
Locally engaged staff working for donors in Samoa hold very competitive positions. 
When I was working at the New Zealand High Commission, other than the 
scholarship programme, a lot of the project work was contracted to both local and 
international consultants. Now donor funded programmes are managed by locally 
engaged staff which is a change in the last 10 years as reflected by D3: “Even local 
staff at the High Comm. are having more responsibilities devolved to them because 
they have the goods to do the job”. 
 
GoS has placed a huge emphasis on educating public servants, and as reflected the 
calibre of individuals that were interviewed were of a high standard. This places 
Samoa in a better position when dealing with donors.  
Long service/ Continuity 
One of the reasons the GoS can confidently converse on the international stage 
when it comes to High Level Aid Effectiveness talks and also hold donors 
accountable is due to the long service and continuity of local staff. GoS3 has been 
working for the GoS for many years, holding senior positions with good exposure to 
aid. GoS5 has worked for both the GoS as well as being a locally engaged staff for a 
major donor therefore having good exposure to processes for both parties in the aid 
relationship. GoS6 has worked for the GoS for 16 years holding senior positions and 
represents the GoS at international forums. GoS1 has served the public sector for 10 
years moving very fast up the ranks. PS3 worked for the GoS for many years before 
moving to the private sector in an area which received core funding from a major 
donor. D3 worked for the GoS after completing a degree qualification from a 
prestigious international university and is now working as a locally engaged staff for 




What has helped to retain local staff working for the GoS is a 42% increase in public 
service salaries as part of the public sector reform programme. The increase was 
staggered over 2005/6 to 2007/8 (Government of Samoa, 2010a). GoS4 comments 
that “...the salary bracket for public servants pays more than the private sector. Back 
in 2003 an ACEO started on SAT$40k, now ACEOs start on SAT$81k. The 
government are providing competitive salaries to keep experienced qualified staff in 
the public sector instead of losing them to private sector”. PS3 laughed and said “the 
private sector often lose valuable staff to the government as we can’t compete with 
government salaries. Once upon a time it used to be the other way around”.  
 
Most diplomatic postings to Samoa are a maximum of three years so Samoa is in a 
stronger position with a long serving public service that has good institutional 
knowledge. The GoS has been clever to retain public servants by adjusting their 
salaries.  
Well prepared, well informed 
The level of experience and expertise held by local staff in different sectors is very 
strong in Samoa. The people that I interviewed were hard working and 
knowledgeable individuals who placed emphasis on being well prepared and well 
informed on their specific areas of work as reflected by GoS3 “I read extensively as 
part of my job and am forever creating, adapting and adjusting what I read to the 
context of Samoa. That is why Samoa is comfortable where we sit with donors and 
the international donor forum...we are always reading and trying to keep abreast of 
up to date discussions, always learning” (GoS6).  
 
Public servants also travel extensively to represent the GoS on different topics of 
interest. GoS1 has travelled widely and never takes this for granted: “work ethics are 
very important and we don’t want to look incompetent, we want to keep it together 
even though the job can put you under a lot of pressure”. GoS1 represented the GoS 
at United Nations conferences where it was imperative to know how to follow due 
procedures for a number of different donor agencies, “There is a culture of taking 
pride in your work so we make sure we know the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ of everything we 
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work on. As a result Samoa knows and understands how to prioritise their 
development needs, they know how to promote the interests of Samoa”.  
 
A typical trait for Pacific people when attending international conferences is to 
remain silent, yet anecdotally GoS representatives have a reputation of being very 
vocal. “I attend these conferences and Pacific people say nothing, yet they are there 
to give feedback on national positions. When I go I make sure I am well read and 
ready to contribute to discussion., It’s not just about picking up your per diems or 
travelling for a vacation, it is hard work” (GoS1). GoS6 reinforced these comments 
by saying “Work travel is not a vacation, it is work and I expect people to go 
prepared. You need to speak up, if not you will be missed out and we don’t want to 
look stupid”. As it is most likely that the same people represent their countries at 
international meetings GoS6 would the opportunity to build relationships and 
networks with small island states, developing an alliance to help promote the 
interests of both countries.  
 
Young staff members are not exempt from this strong work ethic. GoS3 comments “I 
also throw my young staff in the deep end to work hard, read thoroughly and don’t be 
intimidated. My staff receive opportunities to learn new experiences”. This helps with 
junior staff gaining confidence and authority in their line of work and therefore being 
able to articulate what they want (GoS4). 
 
It is also important to bear in mind that the GoS has a relatively small public service 
in comparison to major donors. The people that are representing the GoS on the 
international stage are the same people that entertain mission trips that come 
through Samoa “Australian and New Zealand missions are always impressed by our 
work ethics and what we can get done with limited resources. Any Pacific mission 
visits, it’s the same people that are tasked with entertaining; protocol; and policy. It 
takes lots of multi-tasking but the work gets done and staff take pride in their work” 
(GoS1). 
 
Because GoS officials are well prepared and well informed they are confident in their 
dealings with donors. GoS officials are not shy to state the position of Samoa on 




A strong educated, long-serving, well prepared public service should be linked to 
fa’aSamoa. As mentioned in a previous chapter, fa’aSamoa remains a core value for 
many Samoans scattered around the globe.  
 
I interviewed a palagi in Samoa who works in the private sector. PS2 has been 
resident in Samoa for two years and recently had the opportunity to visit a 
neighbouring Polynesian country. PS2 found that in comparison to Samoa this other 
island had lost a lot of its culture. Housing looked very similar to Western homes, the 
place was overrun by tourists and it seemed everything on the island was designed 
for outsiders rather than the locals. Although PS2 appreciates that proud Samoans 
vary like in any culture, there are some that are subservient and some that are 
proud, one thing that remains is “Samoa is very Samoa, pride runs through the place 
and the culture is very strong. What impressed me about Samoa was that I felt like I 
was in a foreign country, the culture has not been bulldozed aside. I watched a 
movie made in 1926 called ‘Moana’ set in Safune that was about life in Samoa. I was 
impressed to see that everything in the movie from 1926 I had seen since living in 
Samoa since March 2010, pig capture, harvesting taro, umu preparation, fishing, 
collecting coconuts. Sure there were a lot more Western influences but the culture is 
still evident in the place” (PS2). 
 
GoS2 works for a State Owned Enterprise, is not Samoan but from another Pacific 
country. GoS2 found that knowing the Samoan language is very important working 
for the GoS. In order to be a policy analyst in Samoa you must be fluent in both 
Samoan and English. GoS2 found that “if you don’t know the language you will get 
lost. The language and culture in official government settings is very important”. 
 
I found that GoS officials use gagana (language) Samoa to their advantage. GoS8 
gave an example of negotiating with a donor what the donor could financially 
contribute towards rebuilding hotels. The hotels were closed down due to a cyclone 
and as a result local Samoans were without work. The donor was accompanied by a 
locally engaged staff and kept talking around in circles but was not able to commit to 
an amount. GoS8 became increasingly frustrated with the donor so the donor 
eventually committed to a figure. At the end of the meeting as the donor and locally 
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engaged staff were leaving GoS8 said in Samoan to the locally engaged staff “don’t 
come back with your donor if you haven’t got any money”. The donor laughed and 
responded “I think I know what you’re saying” GoS8 replied “good that was my 
intention” and closed the door. All donors in Samoa speak English and follow the 
international aid policy which is also in English so normally donors would be in the 
position of power. However in the example above GoS8 controlled the process by 
introducing gagana. 
 
Understanding fa’aSamoa is difficult to comprehend if you have not lived it in person. 
D3 found this working as a locally engaged staff for a donor. “Sometimes fa’aSamoa 
doesn’t make sense, and as a local staff I see this played out between donors and 
Samoa all the time. One time our donor unintentionally offended a government of 
Samoa representative. When we returned to the office the donor asked me I don’t 
understand why they reacted that way, what did I say wrong to offend them? It was 
difficult to articulate but I knew why Samoa was offended”. 
 
Even in the eyes of the donors Samoans are seen to be strong. “Samoans have no 
inferior complex, even with a colonial history it has not affected them at all. Even if a 
Samoan is not wealthy they are not second best to anyone … very resistant to 
outsiders this sometimes even extends to New Zealand Samoans at times. There is 
definitely nationalism and pride in being Samoan” (DS1). 
 
A candid conversation with GoS2 unfolded a very amusing story. GoS2 studied at 
the University of the South Pacific (Suva) and often found that other Pacific Island 
students would come together to gossip about the Samoan students. “Samoans 
think they’re it, they’re such an arrogant bunch, they think they rule USP Suva 
campus. Most students would support any rugby team that played against Samoa 
because they were so arrogant on the field, and now I’m married to one”.  
 
When working alongside donors this arrogance referred to by GoS2, which others 
might interpret as ‘pride’, go hand in hand with fa’aSamoa. In the context of working 
alongside donors this pride is very strong. Because public servants are experts in 
their respective fields they are confident in their dialogue with donors. “Samoans are 
very vocal and not shy to speak their mind and ask for money. They don’t beat 
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around the bush and sometimes do it in a joking manner but there is a level of truth 
to the request” (GoS2). Samoans do not feel that they are second class citizens in 
their own country nor do they hide the way they feel if they disagree with donors. 
“Samoans are very proud people, ‘who are these palagi coming here and telling us 
what to do on our own soil?’ ” (GoS2) 
 
The locally engaged D3 staff member often jumped between donor and the GoS 
camp throughout our interview. “Samoans can be so stubborn they are willing to be 
poor to prove a point. Even to the point of losing donor funding. Samoans are ‘fierce 
warriors’, we know what we want. We are egalitarian despite our hierarchical 
structure. No matter what our role is we are very proud of our culture. Pride can be 
both a strength and weakness. It’s good that we don’t let people put us down” (D3). 
 
Fa’aSamoa influences the way GoS officials work with donors. GoS Officials are not 
intimidated and use language and culture to assert their development sovereignty.  
Long serving Prime Minister 
As identified in an earlier chapter the Samoan Prime Minister has been in power 
since 1998. A lot of the people I interviewed attributed the strength of the public 
service to Tuilaepa’s strong leadership. “People put their faith in leadership. 
Samoans are strong minded they therefore need someone with thick skin, the PM is 
bright, intelligent and has had a lot of international exposure. He has a finance 
background, Minister of Finance, and has strong leadership skills” (GoS1). GoS3 
said “Tuilaepa isn’t fussed on protocol, but he has a good understanding of finance 
that puts him in a good position to run the country” 
 
Following the 2009 tsunami D3 was fortunate to accompany the GoS on an 
inspection of the devastated areas. Following the inspection a meeting was called at 
the NUS lecture theatre and all government ministers, public, private; CSOs, church 
leaders and the donor community were invited along. It was first time D3 had seen 
Tuilaepa in action. It was obviously a stressful time for Samoa, but Tuilaepa was 
assertive and confident in his address. As the area that was affected was only on the 
South Coast of the island of the main island of Upolu, Tuilaepa assured his people 
they could work together to fix the situation. Tuilaepa turned and asked each 
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government department CEO to provide an update on the status of their work. After 
each update he gave them instructions on what to do from there, creating sub 
committees to support their work. Tuilaepa also actioned the disaster advisory 
committee. D3 comments: “It was so impressive to watch him take control of the 
situation and nothing fazed him, he was confident and didn’t allow emotions to get in 
the way. He was remarkable and I felt so proud to be Samoan that day”. 
 
During natural disasters donors will appear to provide assistance with varying 
motivations for their support. D3 talked about a particular donor who had only 
recently arrived into Samoa and was not aware of the strength of the Samoan 
people. The donor tried to stand up to announce their contribution to the disaster but 
Tuilaepa closed down the announcement by directing the donor to a relevant 
committee. “This wasn’t about donors shining and wanting their assistance heard by 
the media, the focus was on Samoa and its people. We were so happy Tuilaepa did 
this. The donors would be acknowledged at another time”(D3). 
 
In 2009 TV3 presenter John Campbell aired a story accusing Tuilaepa of 
misappropriating donor funds for disaster relief efforts. GoS3 was keen to defend 
Tuilaepa which reflected loyalty and trust to his leadership. I was told by GoS3 that 
all the funds for the tsunami were received and disseminated through the GoS 
financial systems. “Tuilaepa didn’t touch it. He was never involved in the distribution 
of any money. Roads were operational the day after the tsunami with power line 
poles going up. Even relocation roads to the hills were starting to be cut out, it’s an 
ongoing programme that is where the money was spent”.  
 
GoS3 was asked by Tuilaepa to prepare two reports one shortly after the tsunami 
and another post report. Both reports outline how SAT48 million was spent. The GoS 
cannot account for every cent it received. “You must remember that there are funds 
that were only pledged and we still haven’t received that money. Also there was a lot 
of funding that went straight to Non-Government Organisations that we cannot 
account for as we have not been informed about this”(GoS3). 
 
GoS3 spoke with great respect for Tuilaepa and also felt he was unfairly accused by 
John Campbell. Following Campbell’s story, donors that contributed money to the 
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disaster relief effort returned to survey how their money was spent and they left 
feeling pleased with what they saw and did not question Tuilaepa or the GoS on 
Campbell’s accusations (GoS3).  
 
With a strong Prime Minister who is not intimidated by anyone, the GoS officials that 
were interviewed held similar characteristics when working with donors. There is a 
level of patriotism attributed to Tuilaepa by those interviewed and public servants 
were very protective of the Prime Minister and looked to him as a role model.  
GoS officials know how to use donor resources to their benefit  
As the GoS officials are so well versed and keep abreast of high level aid 
effectiveness decisions they are able to hold donors accountable and therefore use 
donor resources to their benefit. Similarly most donors have built strong trusting 
relationships with the GoS over time which has given donors the freedom to release 
aid knowing the GoS has a proven track record.  
 
This was proven when the 2009 tsunami hit Samoa. GoS3 was away and upon 
GoS3’s return a meeting was called between donors. When GoS3 arrived at the 
meeting there was a new donor representative that had only recently landed in 
Samoa for a posting. Whilst GoS3 was aware of the new donor representative they 
had never met face to face and a briefing was not scheduled until GoS3 had 
returned from overseas. With the tsunami recovery efforts underway the new donor 
representative decided to chair the meeting, not being aware of the personalities and 
procedures for the GoS when dealing with donors. Australia joined the meeting on a 
telecon. from Canberra and asked who was chairing the meeting and also asked 
whether GoS3 was present in the meeting as they were not going to participate if 
GoS3 was not there. The recently arrived donor representative soon understood that 
the GoS was in charge of their aid programme and GoS3 took control of the meeting. 
“I advised donors what to do as we have been in a state of emergency before so I 
was calm and I could direct people. The emergency advisory committee was 
activated and we knew what to do” (GoS3).  
 
When interviewing a representative from the private sector who held a senior 
position in the GoS for many years PS4 said “donors don’t bully Samoa, they are in a 
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position of maturity. Samoa also has officials that have worked for donors so they 
know what their demands are and they can deliver on this.”  
 
Donors have conditions that they put in place but the GoS are very clever in finding 
ways to work around these conditions. PS4 gave an example using a European 
Union (EU) water project. Typically for EU projects all material must be purchased 
from Europe. However the GoS wanted to save funding to spend on other areas 
within the project and found they could get material much cheaper from Australia and 
New Zealand. The GoS therefore set up a national standards framework for water 
projects that adopted Australia and New Zealand standards. EU therefore had to 
comply with the GoS national standards that included New Zealand and therefore 
materials were approved to be purchased from New Zealand. “Samoa are motivated 
to get around stringent rules if it means they can save on funding to spend in other 
areas” (PS4). GoS4 reiterates these sentiments. “We draw on what is beneficial for 
us”. 
 
With a strong educated population the GoS also utilises internal sources to gain a 
better understanding of different sectors. GoS6 was working on a programme that 
involved the environment sector. GoS6’s team had little experience in this area so an 
environment expert within the GoS was included in the team so that the most recent 
information on the environment sector was embedded in the programme 
acknowledging local expertise.   
 
Human resources are always a problem when donors work alongside recipient 
countries. GoS4 was approached by a donor who was interested in offering more 
scholarships to the GoS which are always appreciated. However with a limited public 
service who are already stretched GoS4 had to make sure that the offer was not 
going to increase the workload for staff. GoS4 directed the donor to follow the SDS 
2012 – 2016 to find out the GoS priority areas and then suggest suitable tertiary 
institutions where scholarship recipients could be posted. “I don’t have time to 
research this information but the donor knows their training institutes and what suits 
us from the SDS” (GoS4). One could argue that GoS4 may come across as 
ungrateful in this situation, unfortunately the reality for recipient countries is they 
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need to be savvy in the way they manage offers from donors so that they are not 
stretching an already overworked public service.  
 
The GoS understands the strategic plans for each of its donors so it knows who to 
ask to fund particular aid projects and programmes (DS2). For example China is 
more likely to fund infrastructure projects than New Zealand.  
 
The GoS also takes a vested interest in the design of its aid programmes. D1 said 
that “...ten years back donors would lead the development of aid programmes, 
usually with a development consultant tasked with the duty of preparing a first draft 
of the design document. Now Samoa does the first draft of the design document and 
they are not interested in external consultants”. 
  
The GoS has taken on more responsibility of its programme, “...There is a desire for 
education to move to ‘budget support’ bringing together donors and Samoa’s needs. 
Samoa want to analyse the situation against their Education Sector Plan Donors 
offer funding to support this work but the Government of Samoa decline the support 
replying that they want to take responsibility for their own plans” (D1). 
 
Donors have the potential to change their strategic plans based on the directions set 
by newly elected governments. Funding for projects and programmes can therefore 
be affected. No one felt that more than the civil society sector in Samoa who  for 
eight years received funding from New Zealand for its umbrella organisation for 
NGOs. Since the National Party were elected as the government in New Zealand in 
2008, replacing the left wing Labour party, the focus for New Zealand has changed 
and funding has been stopped for the CSO sector. To mitigate this problem the GoS 
set up a Civil Society Support Programme (CSSP) and asked donors to pool their 
resources together to support this sector. Both EU and AusAID provide funding. The 
GoS acted on feedback received from CSO members who “wanted a one stop shop 
to ask for funds, rather than not having an understanding on where to go to when 
they wanted to access donor funding” (CSO1). CSSP is governed by a steering 
committee made up of representatives from the Ministry of Women, Ministry of 
Finance, donors, and two CSO reps (CSO1). Through the CSSP Samoa is able to 
95 
 
negotiate with AusAID and the EU to use one reporting system as the CSO sector do 
not have the capacity to produce different reports for different donors.  
 
PS3 gave an example of how the private sector use donor funding to their 
advantage. The organisation that PS3 manages has received donor funding since 
1994 with partial funding from the GoS. PS3 kept abreast of what was happening 
politically for their donor as they were aware that a change in government could 
affect ongoing funding. PS3 learnt that the then opposition leader was visiting 
Samoa prior to the elections. PS3 made sure that a meeting was arranged to 
showcase the work of their organisation and essentially to secure ongoing funding 
which was necessary for the continuity of their work. The leader of the opposition 
was impressed with the work of PS3 and the staff. PS3 was keen to make a lasting 
impression which paid off when the opposition party for this donor won the elections 
that year.  
 
The company PS3 works for involves their donor as it sees fit. PS3 feels that they 
have nothing to hide and if targets are met then the donors are happy. PS3 has also 
received a message from the GoS to find ways to remain sustainable so that they do 
not become dependent on donor funding. The company PS3 works for has 
developed training programmes that are currently being accredited under the Samoa 
Qualifications Authority and they hope to offer trainings to the region to ensure extra 
funding is received. PS3’s company generates up to SAT100k per year on their own 
through contract work carried out by their staff. PS3 has a good understanding of 
reporting requirements, and staff study these carefully and produce reports 
accordingly. As a result the organisation that PS3 manages has secured funding for 
the next five years from their donor. “You’ve got to perform, everything is analysed 
thoroughly so I make sure systems are in place to cover the work. Building 
relationships with donors is key to meet the needs of Samoa” (PS3). PS3 has also 
received interest from other major donors who were impressed with their work. PS3 
has worked for the GoS and therefore has a good understanding and appreciation of 
what it is like to work with donors. PS3 values the importance of monitoring and 
evaluation and can see why donors need to account for money as they are 
accountable to tax payers so PS3 has no problems in reporting back to donors. PS3 
often gives messages to people that they offer training to. “If you’ve been given 
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money and you didn’t sweat for it, you don’t appreciate the value of the money. If you 
get a loan you know you have to work hard to pay it back so you don’t have a 
relaxed attitude.” PS3 encourages members not to have a dependency attitude 
towards donor funding. 
 
Taking a holistic view of Samoa, the country has a good reputation within the Pacific 
region amongst its peers. I recently travelled with a colleague to Samoa on a work 
trip. My colleague made the comment that Samoa is so similar to New Zealand the 
transition is easy to make between both places because the infrastructure is well set 
up. One thing that is prominent in Samoa compared to other Pacific countries is the 
amount of local businesses run by Samoans. The GoS market these locally-owned 
businesses to donors by using local establishments to host lunches and delegations 
therefore showcasing what can be achieved by Samoans. I am not entirely sure this 
is a strategic move by the GoS to influence the decisions of donors to provide 
funding to the GoS but donors are impressed and feel more confident that money 
can be utilised to improve Samoa’s development. Talking to a prominent business 
owner, PS1 said that the GoS often hosts lunches for visiting missions at PS1’s 
establishment, “The government like to use us an example of a successful business 
owned and operated by a Samoan. We try as much as we can to use local produce 
that is grown by local providers in the area. At our last lunch hosted by a major 
donor, my wine and beverage manager gave a five minute presentation about where 
the local food was grown, who the local growers were and how the food was 
prepared by the local chef of the establishment” (PS1). The head of the delegation 
was really impressed with the presentation and appreciated that the establishment 
was supporting local growers and the produce was of such a high quality. PS1 
continued to say, “we aim to use local produce but still meet international cuisine 
standards”. PS2 reinforced the message of the donors by saying that PS1’s 
establishment is “the flagship for Samoa” (PS2). From this example donors can see 
further opportunities to encourage more local people to grow local produce and 
therefore make opportunities for themselves.  
Development policy 
Development policy is only a partially effective way to indicate whether a recipient of 
aid country has development sovereignty when dealing with donors. However if the 
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theory reflects the practice it really does strengthen the position of a recipient 
country. As shown earlier (chapter six) the GoS has changed its development policy 
to reflect what is happening internationally with aid and what works best for the 
Samoan context. As well as the CSSP fund being set up there is also a Public Sector 
Fund (PSIF) managed from the Prime Minister’s Department that any GoS 
departments can apply to for improving services. Both AusAID and New Zealand are 
donors for PSIF (GoS5). There is a steering committee made up of a representative 
of the Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of Finance, Public Service Commission, 
Ministry of Women, Audit Office, and just recently a donor representative who is an 
observer with no voting rights. The PSIF Steering Committee is guided by the Public 
Admin Sector Plan (PASP) 2007 – 2012 PASP has activities outlined from objectives 
in the SDS. The PSIF Steering Committee decides eligibility of funds based on the 
PASP (GoS5). The distribution of PSIF is through the GoS’s financial systems based 
on the Public Financial Act 2001. “Even though money is from donors all 
departments apply using GoS procedures” (GoS5). 
 
When GoS3 first started working with donors over 20 years ago anyone in Samoa 
could go directly to a donor for assistance and there was no coordination. A 
Coordination Committee was set up but was inactive. As a result problems started to 
surface as recipients were not reporting back to donors to account for funds. Donors 
then came to the GoS to chase up recipients of aid on behalf of the donors. Distrust 
started to occur and donors started to apply strict conditions (GoS3). The 
Coordination Committee was revitalised and tasked with providing a balanced 
perspective for both the donors and the GoS. 
 
The GoS is forever creating, adapting and adjusting its aid programme to the context 
of Samoa. “That is why Samoa is comfortable where we sit with donors and the 
international donor forum” (GoS3). Around eight years after, following global trends, 
the GoS could see the benefits of adapting a sector approach for Samoa (GoS3). 
Changes were made, Cabinet backed this move and Government departments 
followed suit. GoS officials are always reminded, “they are not donor programmes 




In a SWAp there is always a lead donor. The GoS did not like the term ‘lead donor’ 
as it expected to lead its own development. “They prefer the term ‘coordinating 
donor” (D1). The coordinating donor liaises with other donors before sharing 
feedback with the GoS, “we’re busy people, if you want to support us on similar 
work, do it as a joint team” (GoS3). 
 
As mentioned the Samoa Development Strategy is another initiative completely 
owned and delivered by the GoS. “Donors are not part of the draft of design process 
at all” (D1). D1 was not offended at all by not being included in the design process. 
“Fair enough, Samoa need to consult with internal politics first before complicating 
things with donors. There have been consultations in Savai’i for the development of 
the new SDS 2012 - 2016. Donors will be consulted once Samoa is ready” (D1). If in 
a SWAp the development policies clash with donor policies both parties try to find 
common ground. “Samoa [GoS] is not shy to state their position” (D1).  
 
Being overrun by mission trips is always a problem for recipient countries (Wrighton, 
2010). The GoS noticed around five years ago that a large majority of their time was 
taken up hosting mission trips. Most missions were travelling to Samoa when it 
suited them and when donors were not busy. The GoS therefore decided to create a 
calendar for mission visits. At the start of every year calendar year donors are asked 
to give a schedule for their proposed mission visits then a calendar is developed and 
sent to all donors so that mission visits are coordinated and planned. The GoS also 
has a ‘mission free zone’ from mid March to the end of April and November – 
December so that the GoS can work on budgets and prepare for the Christmas 
season (D1). The GoS reserves the right to allow missions through that are deemed 
important to them. “At first the donors did not take it seriously until they saw that no 
one was available when their missions arrived in country and it was embarrassing. 
As a result donors started to take it seriously and they now comply” (GoS3). The 
mission schedule allows the GoS to prepare accordingly as they know what donors 
are coming for and when. 
 
A meeting is held every three months and donors can ask or discuss whatever they 
wish. An agenda is sent around prior to the meetings and the outcomes assist in 
donor planning (GoS3). With the development of the SDS 2012 – 2016 the donor 
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meeting in April 2012 was dedicated to discussing the SDS. Donors are then able to 
align their strategic plans to the SDS. “It is also at these meetings that we hold 
donors accountable and keep all parties on a common table” (GoS3). 
GoS officials are assertive in their dealings with donors 
This research would suggest or confirm that the GoS is not afraid to challenge 
donors even to the extent of losing donor funding. The GoS decides on its own aid 
programme and its own processes (D3). GoS7 works as an assets manager for a 
government department and a donor had signed an agreement with the GoS to build 
a major infrastructure project. GoS7 was part of a panel that welcomed the donor at 
the very first meeting. The donor came to the meeting with two building plans and 
asked the panel to choose one and the donor would build it. The panel looked at the 
donor in surprise and reviewed both plans before replying that neither of the options 
suited the GoS. The donor responded that the agreement was already signed with 
the GoS so one of the two options should be chosen. The panel disagreed and the 
donor left the meeting. GoS7 said they waited for three months almost thinking that 
the donor had retracted their offer. Four months later the donor returned having 
changed their approach this time asking the GoS representatives, “ok tell us what 
you want. That’s when we gave them plans on what we wanted so that a purpose-
built structure could be provided” (GoS7). The building is now underway and there 
are milestones that are set at each stage of the project between the donors the GoS. 
“Eight times out of 10 the donor delivers on what we ask for. If the two things they fail 
to deliver on are not worth fighting for then we show flexibility and let it go. We trade 
off some things if it’s not important. However if there are things that are essential to 
our work then we don’t compromise and we fight to rectify it” (GoS7).  
 
D3 was part of a donor dialogue with a GoS ministry that has very strong 
personalities at its helm. The GoS were adamant on where they wanted to spend 
donor funding but the donor disagreed. The GoS representative replied: “are you 
telling us that we don’t know what we want? Donors go in with their agenda, 
especially new diplomats, but after one meeting with the Government of Samoa they 




D3 was part of a donor/ GoS meeting where a donor adviser provided some strong 
feedback to the GoS. The GoS representative was not impressed with the donor 
adviser’s feedback and replied: “the days of colonisation in Samoa have long gone, 
the things that you are asking us to do have not worked, the things we are asking 
you to support us with will work because we know the context. If you bring your 
funds with conditions, there’s the door” (D3). The GoS representative then stood up 
and walked out. D3 commented that the GoS would rather have no money than 
accept the money with the tight conditions and restrictions. “It really showed who’s 
the boss!” (D3). “Donors assume they know what’s best for us, but Samoa is mature 
enough to say no that is not going to be good for us and we’re not interested in that 
assistance” (GoS3)  
 
Interestingly as D3 is a locally engaged staff and speaks fluently in both Samoan and 
English this person is often used by the GoS to get messages across to donors if the 
GoS feels the donor is not listening or is asking too many questions. D3 was sitting 
in a meeting where a particular donor kept asking questions of the GoS. The GoS 
representative leaned over to their team and asked how much the donor who was 
asking all the questions was giving to the project? The reply was only 10% of the 
budget. The GoS representative then said in Samoan to all the locally engaged 
donor staff, “tell the donor who is asking all the questions that they are only 
contributing 10% of the budget to the programme so they really should only be 
asking 10% of the questions” (D3).  
Donors trust GoS development processes and procedures 
“You’ve got to be constantly reading to keep up. With donors if you can demonstrate 
you can account for money then you get a bigger cut of the pie” (GoS6). As reflected 
earlier in this chapter the GoS are very assertive when working alongside donors. 
“We can make these demands to donors because if you look at our age and 
experience we walk the talk” (GoS3). I found donors to be quite flexible in their 
dealings with the GoS. Donors were complimentary of the GoS. “What is common 
place in the Pacific isn’t necessarily common place here in Samoa” (D1).   
 
D1 was happy with the quarterly meetings hosted by the GoS that link traditional and 
non-traditional donors together and provide opportunities for all donors to ask 
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questions regarding the delivery of aid to Samoa. The pooling of money together for 
a common goal places the GoS at the forefront of its development. The GoS does 
not feel threatened by donors and happily directs them (D1). “Samoa [GoS] don’t 
mince their words and they won’t hesitate to tell people both local and donors if they 
weren’t doing what Samoa [GoS] asked for” (GoS2). 
 
There are some donors who are able to make decisions on the spot for their 
respective governments. However others need to check back with their head offices 
before decisions can be made. The GoS, although preferring decisions to be made 
by posts in-country, show flexibility to the different donor processes (GoS3).   
 
Donors show flexibility when dealing with the GoS because, “Samoa [GoS] has good 
systems in place to manage donor funds” (D3). These good systems assist the GoS 
to secure money from donors and therefore releases the GoS from having real local 
ownership (D3): “The more I work in this role the more I know it’s about a common 
sense approach, listening carefully and making sure we do what Samoa want”. 
 
When GoS2 worked as a locally engaged donor staff, “it was the objective of the 
donor to always push for the good of Samoa”. Another reason donors felt confident 
was due to the GoS staff. “The new CEO for Education worked in education for a 
long time and joined the Ministry knowing and understanding the sector as well as 
the donor requirements.  Having the right people with the right skills and experience 
does put confidence in the donors that aid money is in good hands” (GoS2). 
 
The GoS is the implementing agency and donors play an advisory role (GoS2). 
AusAID is perhaps the most trusting of donors and have already provided budget 
support to the GoS. GoS2 now works for a state owned enterprise which receives a 
substantial amount of donor funding. The donor is not interested in quarterly reports 
and is happy to receive one report at the end of the project on how the money was 
spent. This is not an easy decision for donors to make but I got the sense from the 
people that I interviewed, both donors and GoS, that donors are pleased with the 




If donors feel confident to use the financial systems of a recipient government it is a 
good indicator of the recipient country having good financial systems in place. 
“Samoa has a reasonably robust public finance system, reasonably accountable and 
they don’t overspend. This means donors have reasonable confidence to hand over 
money” (D1). The GoS has been working hard on the development of their financial 
systems to meet international standards since 2006. Rather than having a raft of 
different donor financial systems to report on, the GoS would prefer for donors to use 
the GoS’s financial systems. Ultimately the GoS would prefer and are actively 
encouraging donors to give aid as budget support. “The benefits of sector budget 
support is that it throws out the window all the complex procedures some donors 
have in place and we can use our own financial processes” (GoS3). It will take some 
time before this materialises but already donors are working towards budget support.  
 
The EU is giving the GoS sector budget support based on the outcomes of the 
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) review (see chapter four). 
The donors were happy with the results of PEFA and saw that the GoS were actively 
implementing feedback from the review and the processes in place worked for the 
GoS (GoS3). Other benefits for the GoS if they perform well in the use of donor 
funds from the EU and there is surplus money left over from countries within the 
African Caribbean Pacific programme - it will be allocated additional money for 
meeting development targets. “Samoa receives $5m from AusAID and $1ml from 
New Zealand for general budget support and we can spend this on anything we 
want. This contribution is on top of what these donors give us in the bilateral 
programme” (GoS3). 
 
The GoS is confident in its development processes and procedures. “We are good at 
accounting for how we spend donor funds. We spend money on what we say we are 
spending it on, donors are therefore happy with financial framework” (GoS6); “We 
perform well and donors see value for money, they see money is well spent” (GoS4); 
“We’re set up with processes of what we want. We have a good reputation in 
managing funds, donors are willing to let us take lead roles. Donors will only release 




Regionally GoS is strong in comparison to its peers 
The GoS is held up as an example for other Pacific Island aid recipients to follow. 
Some countries within the region take this well while others find the GoS to be 
arrogant. I1 has attended regional meetings on behalf of a Pacific country for some 
time. At regional meetings donors can take the lead in discussions, particularly 
because they have the resources to provide a team of advisers to support their 
representatives. I1 has always been impressed and at the same time amused by the 
GoS who is always vocal during discussions and behaves like the strong donors. 
“Like the rest of the Pacific Island countries the GoS do not have a raft of advisers 
supporting them but they have experience and really know their stuff” (I1). I1 also 
laughs and recalls other Pacific Island countries that often roll their eyes when 
Samoa is being held up as a shining light of the Pacific “I think people just get sick of 
hearing how good Samoa is when others want to get ahead too” (I1). 
 
Because the GoS is strong when working alongside donors they are not shy to give 
hard-to-hear advice to their Pacific peers. GoS3 is often asked my counterparts in 
neighbouring Pacific countries “how do you stand up to donors? My reply is if we can 
do it, you can do it. It’s your aid programme not the donors” (GoS3). 
 
Pacific Island countries also receive support from regional organisations. GoS6 was 
one of a number of country officials in the region that received a foreign adviser to 
assist with a particular piece of work. The position for the GoS was filled by a young 
foreign graduate who lacked experience so GoS6 used the graduate as an extra pair 
of hands in the office. The adviser has a travel budget that allows for travel to 
relevant meetings. GoS6 decides when and where the adviser travels and a GoS will 
always lead the delegation. Other recipients within the region have used their adviser 
position to speak on their behalf and the adviser often leads the delegation. When 
GoS6 was asked by other representatives within the region “where is your adviser?” 
GoS6 replied “why would a foreigner speak on behalf of Samoa? We will speak for 
ourselves” (GoS6). GoS3 reinforces these sentiments by saying “don’t place the 
Pacific under one size fits all”. At regional meetings GoS officials  are known for their 
upfront honesty and not hiding their feelings “I don’t talk a lot but choose the time 
and my words very carefully to leave an impact on discussions. I tell Pacific countries 
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if you’re not good at securing money you’ll be left behind, move with the times” 
(GoS3). 
 
GoS5 formally worked for a major donor in Samoa and attended training for all 
locally engaged staff members within the Pacific. One individual from a Pacific 
country shared how a consultant was tasked with writing a development plan for their 
government. The consultant spent two weeks in country, wrote the development plan 
and then sent the plan back for approval. As the government were approving the 
plan there was reference to Kenya throughout the whole document. As this 
representative was sharing his story GoS5 asked “were you not keeping the 
consultant accountable every step of the way, and were you involved in the design 
process of the document?”. The individual replied, “no”. GoS5 was so irate with the 
response that they said: “well the problem doesn’t lie with the consultant, the 
problem lies with your people. If some outsider comes in and does high level work 
for your country’s future direction and you aren’t proactive in getting involved well 
quite frankly you deserve the development plan for Kenya!” Whether the example of 
this country getting a copy and paste of the development plan for Kenya is true or 
not I have shared this anecdote to show just how strong the GoS is regionally and 
how they are not afraid to speak whether people want to hear it or not.  
 
Conclusion 
It is easy to see from the ten markers of development sovereignty highlighted in this 
chapter that the GoS exercises development sovereignty when dealing with donors. 
All sectors in Samoa from public, private and CSOs provided good examples of how 
recipients of aid can be sovereign in its delivery. Donors also supported this view 
that are reflected in their responses.  
 
The reason why the GoS can be sovereign in the delivery of its aid programme 
comes down to its experience as a nation when it is dealing with donors and aid. 
Public servants are well educated and prepared individuals who can confidently 
compete on the international stage alongside big and influential donors. Because of 
their strength and experience the GoS is not afraid to assert is authority and tell 
donors if they feel its development strategy is being compromised, despite possibly 
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losing donor funding. The donors are given confidence that their aid funds are being 
well spent due to the fact that the GoS has relatively good financial systems in place 
to account for the use of donor funds. The GoS know the donor processes so well 
that it has stuck to financial accounting systems for respective donors and now 
donors like AusAID have done away with their own financial reporting systems and 
adopted that of the GoS. The GoS is a mature aid recipient and this chapter reflects 






CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusion 
 
Summary  
The aim of this thesis is to examine how the Government of Samoa asserts its 
development policy sovereignty when working with donors. The aim suggests at the 
outset that the GoS already has development policy sovereignty when working 
alongside donors which was identified early on in this research after a review of the 
GoS development policy. However, policy and practice can reflect very different 
outcomes which set this thesis on its path to discover how development policy 
sovereignty is being asserted by the GoS.  
 
Over the past 50 years donors have trialled a number of different aid modalities such 
as project funding, Structural Adjustment Programmes, Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers, Sector Wide Approaches and budget support to deliver aid to recipient 
countries. By and large aid has increased over time particularly in the last decade but 
there has been a shift in the delivery of aid that encourages donors to work more 
effectively under the principles signed in the Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness 
2005. It is these principles in the Paris Declaration that has given Samoa the license 
to have sovereignty when working alongside donors. Sovereignty therefore, in the 
context of this research, not only refers to the conventional state sovereignty but 
more to how the theory on how aid is exercised by both the GoS and donors on a 
day-to-day basis. 
 
The GoS’s assertiveness with donors is also reflected in their colonial history. Samoa 
was  fortunate not to have a very long colonial history. Prior to Tongan rule each 
village was governed by their district political system with no national political body  
which made it easy for foreign poweres to take control of Samoa. When the German 
and New Zealand governments controlled Samoa between 1900 – 1962 the four 
tama’aiga (paramount) titles (Tuia’ana, Tu’iatua, Gatoaitele, and Tamasoali’I - 
referred to as Tafa’ifa) were established and was crutial in leading Samoa to 
Independence. The Tafa’ifa became the national political body that could stand up for 
the district levels and back the resistance group Mau a Pule. Although there was a 
strong push by foreign powers to establish colonial rule, Samoa pushed back through 
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the Mau and proved to foreign powers that they were not going to stand for 
colonisation. In chapter three we can see how Samoa has taken Western concepts 
such as Christianity and blended this into fa’aSamoa creating a unique set of 
denominations.  
 
Preparing for independence in 1962, Samoa worked closely with New Zealand to 
ensure that fa’aSamoa was an integral part of the new government. The Tafa’ifa all 
held key positions in the first government and Samoa’s political system merged a  
Western model with the village polical system. In 1990 the Village Fono Act 
recognised the leadership of matai (chiefs) at the local level. Whilst there are traces 
of colonisation in Samoa today, their Fa’aSamoa is still strong reflecting a country 
that were vocal in the development of their independence. Equally the signing of the 
Treaty of Friendship in 1962 between Samoa and New Zealand has provided 
financial benefits for Samoa as well as opportunities for Samoans to live in New 
Zealand as citizens.  
 
As this study is about development policy sovereignty for the GoS, finding a suitable 
methodology was crucial. Ensuring that Samoa were at the centre of this research 
aligned with the owneship principle of the Paris Declaration. The voice of Samoa 
needed to be heard throughout this study and being Samoan, understanding the 
culture and being fluent in both Samoan and English (the two official languages of 
Samoa) I was influenced by worldviews and ontology which is outlined in chapter 
four. The methodology for this research is qualitative and the methods used were 
interviews/ talanoa as well as a review of the GoS documentation and my own 
personal observations from working in Samoa over the past 10 years.   
 
To appreciate the findings of my interviews it is important to provide a backdrop of 
the current aid programme for the GoS. The governing party HRPP has had an 
uninteruppted reign since 1982. There have been government officials who have 
been working in the aid sector for the same length of time so there is good 
understanding of donor practices and relevant experience to be assertive. Chapter 




Reviewing the development policy of Samoa is essential to identify whether the new 
global aid agenda is evident in the GoS development policy. Chapter six examines 
development policy on a global, regional and local level. There is strong evidence to 
show that development policy at a global level is reflected in the GoS development 
policy at a local level as shown by the Strategy for the Development of Samoa 2012 
– 2016 and the Development Coorperation Policy. The GoS also engaged in different 
aid modalities such as  Structural Adjustment Programmes and Sector Wide 
Approaches. The more recent Paris Declaration is commonly referred to by all 
sectors in Samoa and the GoS are keen to ensure that they are up to date with the 
global aid agenda. However at a regional level it is clear that the GoS does not really 
gain a lot in terms of development policy. Samoa is seen as a type of ‘big brother’ 
within the region and GoS officials are often used to review their peers under the 
Cairns Compact.   
 
How then does the GoS assert their development sovereignty? There were a number 
of examples how the GoS assert their development policy sovereignty when working 
alongside donors. The GoS officials are an experienced, educated group who are 
well prepared and informed and have not only aligned their development policy to the 
global aid agenda as already identified but they also put the theory into practice. The 
GoS officials have gained credibility with donors and subsequently donors are able to 
be more flexible with conditions due to long lasting relationships with donors and the 
GoS’s proven ability to account for donor funding.  
 
In order for donors to release funds to the GoS there needs to have confidence in the 
GoS financial systems. For example Australia now only uses GoS financial reporting 
systems which makes it easier for the GoS rather than using a myriad of different 
financial systems. Donors are coordinated with their approaches being careful not to 
double up on administrative tasks.  
 
The GoS also has a good understanding of what each donor can provide funding for 
and they use this knowledge to their advantage. This is reflected in the SDS 2012 – 
2016 that provides option areas for donors to fund. As a result of these markers of 
development sovereignty the GoS are therefore able to talk candidly to donors if it 




The GoS has recognised that it is the leader of its development, it is sovereign. Aid 
does make a huge contribution to the GoS but just how that contribution is delivered 
is within a Samoa context that works for the people of Samoa. I have identified seven 
major learnings from this research to provide a summary of my findings: 
 
1) The GoS is sovereign in the delivery of its aid programme? 
As mentioned throughout this study, identified at the outset of this research is the fact 
that the GoS is sovereign in the delivery of its aid progamme. I arrived at this 
conclusion after doing a review of the GoS development policy as well as from my 
own experience of working in Samoa since 2002. This was further reinforced 
following my interviews with comments such as, “the days of colonisation in Samoa 
have long gone. The things that you are asking us to do have not worked, the things 
we are asking you to support us with will work because we know the context. If you 
bring your funds with conditions, there’s the door” (D3). This comment reflects a 
mature aid recipient who is willing to jeopardise funding if the GoS feels donors are 
compromising on what the GoS is asking for. This was further reinforced by GoS3 
who said, “donors assume they know what’s best for us, but Samoa is mature 
enough to say no that is not going to be good for us and we’re not interested in that 
assistance”. 
 
2) Sovereignty is not new to Samoa. 
From chapter three we can see that the concept of ‘sovereignty’ is not new to 
Samoa. Foreign rulers tried to control Samoa and implement Western influences that 
did not work for the local people. Subsequently the resistance Mau movement 
emerged and, despite strong efforts from the German and New Zealand 
administration to disempower the movement by exiling their leaders, the Mau 
movement did not give up. Samoa therefore came out of a period of colonisation 
relatively unscathed and with their culture still in tact. Fa’aSamoa was included in the 
formation of a new government at Independence and the matai system was also 




3) Samoa places major emphasis on the global aid agenda and lesser focus on 
the regional aid agenda. 
The development policy in Samoa reflects the outcomes of the high level aid 
effectiveness forums. The GoS is up to date with the global aid agenda and have 
conducted reviews of the MDGs as well as an evaluation of the Paris Declaration 
2005 and Accra Agenda for Action 2008 in the context of Samoa. The GoS officials 
are proactive in staying abreast of what is happening on an international level with 
aid and adjusting their aid programme locally accordingly. All sectors that I 
interviewed have a good understanding and appreciation of the principles of the 
Paris Declaration which gives them confidence when working alongside donors.  
 
On a regional level however, the GoS seems to engage for the benefit of its peers 
rather than the GoS actually gaining any real benefits. Some of the comments made 
by the GoS representatives that I interviewed reflect that the GoS seems more 
advanced than their regional peers. Additionally the GoS is often part of peer review 
teams under the Cairns Compact indicating that the GoS has an idea of what is 
required to improve aid programmes for their peers.  
 
4) Samoa has made aid work for them.  
Looking at the the GoS development policy the Samoa Development Strategy (SDS) 
2012 – 2016 shows that the GoS has taken into consideration the different types of 
assistance each donor working in Samoa has to offer. The SDS was written by 
Samoa for Samoa with wide consultation with all sectors within Samoa. The beauty 
of the SDS is that it caters for all donor budgets and their respective focus areas. The 
SDS is a clever tool to utilise donor funding while placing Samoa at the centre of its 
own development.  
  
5) GoS officials are a clear strength. 
The GoS offcials that I interviewed are an educated group of people. I was 
impressed with their strong work ethic and the way that they placed a huge 
importance of staying in tune with development policy internationally as reflected in 
their development policy nationally. There is a pride and patriotism in Samoa that 
runs across all sectors and this pride is carried even further when working alongside 
donors. Through my line of work at VSA in there have been times recipient countries 
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who have had a negative dealings with volunteers are reluctant to voice their feeligns 
because they fear by telling the truth it may affect receiving ongoing assistance. In 
the case of the Samoans I interviewed there is no fear in telling donors how they 
really feel even to the point of losing the funding. This is articulated beautifully by 
GoS3. “...We can make these demands to donors because if you look at our age and 
experience, we walk the talk”. 
 
The GoS have identified that to ensure the institutional knowledge remains in the 
public sector there has been an increase in pay that exceeds what the private sector 
are offering. GoS officials can therefore remain in roles that are challenging but also 
recognises where they are remunerated for their skills. By GoS officials staying in 
their roles longer they are able to lead relationships with donors who are only on a 
maximum of three year postings, lead the donor – recipient dialogue and the donor 
aligns accordingly.  
 
6) GoS processes are relatively robust and usable by donors. 
The outcomes of the Public Expenditure Review recognises a relatively robust 
financial system that donors can trust and adds to the development sovereignty of 
the GoS. The Australian Government use only the GoS financial systems and saves 
the Ministy of Finance having to account for the use of donor funds using a myriad of 
different systems. This is less of strain on human resources. If all donors recognised 
the GoS financial systems as robust it would make accounting for funding easier for 
GoS public servants.  
Final comments 
Using these learnings I have been able to show how the GoS assert their 
development policy sovereignty when working alongside donors. Using Hauofa’s 
(1993) view, although Samoa is small comparitively to its large donors, I argue that 
Samoa ‘punches above its weight’. The view of a helpless, defenceless, dependent  
country soon diminishes after speaking to all sectors of Samoan society when is is 
clear the local officials controlling aid in Samoa are educated, strong and confident 




Samoa is a good example for other recipient countries to follow. I would like to end 
with a comment made by GoS3 who made this statement to recipient countries within 
the region as I believe this best describes the outcome of this study: “they are not 
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APPENDIX 3: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 
 
Government of Samoa Private Sector Civil Society Organisation Donor Independent 
GoS1 PS1 CSO1 D1 I1 
GoS2 PS2  D2  
GoS3 PS3  D3  
GoS4 PS4    
GoS5     
GoS6     
GoS7     


























APPENDIX 4: Semi structured Interview questions to frame my 
‘talanoa’ interviews. 
 
1. What is your role and can you explain where your role fits within the donor/ 
recipient relationship. How long have you been in the position?  
 
2. What does your work involve? 
 
 
3. What are the key relationships you have in Samoa?  
 
4. Who are the key donors/ GoS officials you work with and what are the key 
relationships you have with them and other development agencies? 
 
 
5. Can you explain your level of engagement with these donors/ GoS officials? 
 
 
6. Does the level of engagement raise any issues at a professional or 
government management level for you or others?  Give me some examples of 
the issues you are referring to. 
 
7. What are the sort of things that happen in the development relationship that 
make you feel that you have control over your own country’s development 
agenda?  
 
8. What are the sort of things that happen in the development relationship that 





9. What opportunities exist for changing sovereignty practice to enhance the 
level of control you feel at a personal, departmental, structural or whole of 
government level? 
 




























APPENDIX 5: List of Government of Samoa Ministries (Government 
of Samoa, 2011) 
 
1) MAF - Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries / Matagaluega o Faatoaga ma 
Faigafaiva 
2) MCIL - Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labour / Matagaluega o Pisinisi, 
Alamanuia ma Leipa 
3) MCIT - Ministry of Communication and Information Technology / Matagaluega o 
Fesootaiga, Faamatalaga ma Feso'otaiga Vavave Fa'aneionapo 
4) MESC – Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture / Matagaluega o Aoga, Taaloga 
ma Aganuu 
5) MFAT - Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade / Matagaluega o le Va i Fafo ma 
Fefaatauaiga 
6) MJCA - Ministry of Justice, and Courts Administration / Matagaluega o 
Faamasinoga ma le Faafoeina o Tulaga Tau Faamasinoga 
7) MNRE - Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment /Matagaluega o Punaoa 
Faalenatura ma le Siosiomaga 
8) MOF - Ministry of Finance / Matagaluega o Tupe 
9) MOH - Ministry of Health / Matagaluega o le Soifua Maloloina 
10) MOR - Ministry of Revenue / Matagaluega o Tupe Maua 
11) MPMC - Ministry of Prime Minister and Cabinet / Matagaluega a le Palemia ma 
le Kapeneta 
12) MWCSD - Ministry of Women, Community and Social Development / 
Matagaluega o Tina, ma Aga Fesootai 
13) MWTI - Ministry of Works, Transport and Infrastructure /Matagulega o Galuega, 










APPENDIX 6: 14 Key National Outcomes set out in the Samoa 
Development Strategy 2012 – 2016. 
 
Priority Area 1: Economic Sectors 
 Key Outcome 1: Macroeconomic Stability  
 Key Outcome 2: Re-invigorate Agriculture  
 Key Outcome 3: Revitalized Exports  
 Key Outcome 4: Sustainable Tourism  
 Key Outcome 5: Enabling Environment for Business Development  




 Trade and  
 Public Administration 
  
Priority Area 2: Social Policies 
 Key Outcome 6: Healthy Samoa 
 Key Outcome 7: Improve Focus on Access to Education, Training and Learning 
Outcome 
 Key Outcome 8: Social Cohesion 
Sectors covered are:  
 Health 
 Education 
 Community and  
 Law and Justice 
  
 Priority Area 3: Infrastructure Sector 
 Key Outcome 9: Sustainable Access to Safe Drinking Water and Basic Sanitation 
 Key Outcome 10: Efficient, Safe and Sustainable Transport System and Networks  
 Key Outcome 11: Universal Access to Reliable and Affordable ICT Services  
 Key Outcome 12: Sustainable Energy Supply 





 Communication and  
 Energy 
Priority Area 4: The Environment 
 Key Outcome 13: Environment Sustainability  
 Key Outcome 14: Climate and Disaster Resilience 
Sectors covered are:  
 Environmental Sustainability 
 Climate and Disaster Resilience 
(Government of Samoa, 2012b) 
 
